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           The reality of Jane Austen’s characters in Pride and Prejudice is 
socially constructed; their goals and actions become a typification of 
society’s institutions and conventions.  Examining Austen’s pivotal 
characters, with a particular focus on Fitzwilliam Darcy, reveals that each 
is a product of a socio-cultural determinism as they reflect social 
institutions and represent cultural conventions.   
           Gender categorizes social interactions in everyday life.  As 
individuals act out gendered prescripts and expectations, they create 
gendered systems of dominance and power.  These learned patterns of 
gender norms and roles are carried out in everyday life with “masculine” 
and “feminine” perpetuated as divergent and oppositional.  Austen’s Mr. 
Darcy is the product of the social construction of gender.  Darcy’s actions 
and self-representation reflect a historicity and ideology that is founded 
on gendered power relations.  His is the ideology of patriarchy which 
guarantees the hegemonic position of men and the oppression of women.   
           Language establishes and maintains the connection between 
personal identity and gender identity that produces the problem of 
masculine/feminine duality.  In an effort to recast the prevailing 
masculine rhetorical structures that have defined language and society, 
Austen creates, in Pride and Prejudice, a model of feminine writing that 
deconstructs the repressive structures of thinking that invent gender 
inequality.  Jane Austen offers us a new manner of masculinity in the 
“transformation” of Fitzwilliam Darcy and a feminist’s recasting of 
relations between genders. 
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Constructing Mr. Darcy: Tradition, Gender, and Silent Spaces 
in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice 
           An Introduction 
            
           The ways of becoming and being human are as numerous and 
diverse as man’s cultures; humanness is socio-culturally variable. The 
specific shape into which this humanness is molded is determined by 
those socio-cultural formations and is relative to their numerous 
variations.  Peter Berger states that Man (both male and female) constructs 
his or own nature, or more simply, man produces himself: “there is no 
human nature in the sense of a biologically fixed substratum determining 
the variability of socio-cultural formations” (47).  The development of the 
human infant is dependent upon certain social arrangements; the 
direction of organic development, and indeed a large part of biological 
being, as such, are subjected to continuing socially determined 
interference.  As soon as one observes phenomena that are specifically 
human, one enters the realm of the social, for as Berger states, “Man’s 
specific humanity and his sociality are inextricably intertwined.  Homo 
sapien is always, and in the same measure, homo socius” (49).   
                
  Hamilton 2 
           Human existence takes place in a context of order, direction, and 
stability.  Social order is a human product, or more precisely, an ongoing  
human production which precedes any individual organic development.  
Judith Lorber states that the primary system of social control in any 
society is found in the existence of institutions:  “Institutionalization is 
incipient in every social situation continuing in time” (14).  Lorber 
explains that individuals perform “discrete institutionalized actions 
within the context of their biography” everyday of their lives, and soon 
the institutional world is experienced as a body of valid truths making up 
everyday reality.  Members of a society assume that the institutions do, 
indeed, function and integrate as they are supposed to, and since the well-
institutionalized individual “knows” that the social world is a fixed and 
consistent whole, he or she will be constrained to rationalize both its 
functioning and malfunctioning in terms of this “knowledge” (14).  For 
the large majority, this rationalization is carried out successfully, though 
often unconsciously, in our attitudes and behaviors via the language we 
incorporate into our daily lives, and which consequently structures our 
very existence.    
           Language provides the fundamental burden of logic on the 
objectified social world.  Joyce Hertzler states that “the edifice of 
legitimations is built upon language and uses language as its principal  
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instrumentality” (182,183).  The logic thus attributed to the institutional 
order is part of the socially available stock of knowledge and taken for 
granted as such.  Everyday knowledge constitutes the motivating 
dynamics of institutional conduct and designates all situations occurring  
within them.  This everyday reality defines and constructs the roles to be 
played in the context of the social institutions in question.   
           For the individual, gender construction starts with assignment to a 
sex category on the basis of the genitalia at birth.  A sex category becomes 
a gender status through naming, dress, and the use of other gender 
markers.  Judith Lorber states: 
                 Once a child’s gender is evident, others treat those in one 
                 gender differently than those in the other, and the children  
                 respond to the different treatment by feeling different and  
                 behaving differently.  As soon as they can talk, they start to  
                 refer to themselves as members of their gender.  (14) 
 
Parenting is gendered, with different expectations for mothers and for 
fathers.  The work adults do as mothers and fathers and the different roles 
and responsibilities they perform each day shapes women’s and men’s life 
experiences.  Those experiences produce different personality 
characteristics, consciousnesses, relationships, motivations, and skills—
ways of being that we categorize as feminine or masculine.  All of these 
processes constitute the social construction of gender.  The process of  
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gendering and its outcome are legitimated by religion, law, science, and 
the society’s entire set of values.   
           When we hear that gender is socially constructed, we often 
mistakenly understand the term to mean that we, as individuals, are not  
responsible for what we do.  Michael Kimmel points out that we might 
hear someone say “Society made me like this,” or “It’s not my fault” (87).  
This form of rhetorical strategy, or what Kimmel refers to as “reflexive 
passivity,” is a device we use to deflect individual accountability and 
responsibility, and “It is also a misreading of the sociological mandate” 
(87).  When we say that social identity is socially constructed, what we do 
mean is that our identities are a fluid assemblage of the meanings and 
behaviors that we construct from the values, images, and prescriptions we 
find in the world around us.  Our gendered identities are both voluntary-
we choose to become who we are-and coerced-we are pressured, forced, 
sanctioned, and often physically beaten into submission to some rules.  
We neither make up the rules, nor do we glide perfectly and effortlessly 
into these pre-assigned roles.   
           Becoming masculine or feminine is, for some in Western society, a 
smooth and almost natural transition into behaviors and attitudes that are 
familiar and supportive.  For others, it is an incessant and oppressive 
nightmare in which some parts of ourselves must be suppressed to please  
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others—or simply to survive.  For most of us the experience falls 
somewhere in between.  There are dimensions of ourselves we love and 
wouldn’t want to part with, and other parts where we feel we’ve been 
forced to exaggerate selfhood at the expense of others.  A sociological  
perspective specifies the ways in which our own experiences, our 
interactions with others, and the institutions combine to shape our sense  
of who and what we are.  Biology provides the basic components, while 
society and history provide the context, the road map we follow to 
construct our identities and our lives. 
           Jane Austen’s novel, Pride and Prejudice, reveals that when a society 
is blindly and exclusively constructed as male, women must live with the 
consequences of the culture’s distorted and misrepresented conventions 
and values.  The recognition, by Austen’s female characters, of social 
powerlessness under difficult and unequal conditions is juxtaposed 
against the author’s male characters and the reader’s recognition that the 
use and misuse of social power accrues to the male gender, since 
patriarchy always and explicitly serves men.  Austen’s Mr. Darcy is a 
representation of hegemonic masculinity.  He is the product of a 
patriarchal historicity that promotes inequalities of power and 
domination.  Darcy has been taught and conditioned to think of  
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relationships with young women, such as Elizabeth Bennet, as man and 
ornament, not as equal human beings.  Darcy must be re-taught and 
re-conditioned to discard patriarchal notions of relations between men 
and women and reject as unworthy the conventional model of 
heterosexual love relations, which overemphasize men’s interests and 
neglect women’s desires.   
           Darcy’s individuality is constituted by what is male, by the 
permanent assignment of masculinity to the role of subject, while the 
feminine is denied subjectivity and assigned to the role of object.  Austen’s 
novel needs to be re-opened in order to discuss the ways class and gender 
have shaped her characters’ existence, for as Sarah S. G. Frantz points out, 
“Marginality is visible and painfully visceral” (158).  Austen’s novel 
exposes a set of socially constructed attitudes and behaviors that keep 
masculinity masked and render femininity problematic.  Her delicate, yet 
cunning, authorship shows us that men such as Fitzwilliam Darcy benefit 
from the inherited biological and sex-role definitions of masculinity, 
which implies activity, mastery, rationality, and competence.  If gender 
relations are encoded in our genes or culturally mandated, then the extent 
to which these definitions are based on men’s power over women is 
obscured.  Feminism has enabled us to see the sleight-of-hand that 
substitutes “normal” for normative.  If we understand today the centrality  
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of gender as an organizing principle of social life, it is because modern 
feminist research and politics, aided by the early efforts of women writers 
such as Jane Austen, has compelled us to do so. 
           For Jane Austen, the formation of existing discourse serves to 
defend the dominant masculine position within a strict patriarchal culture 
by sanctioning hierarchal roles as innate and moral.  Woman’s sexuality  
and the language in which we communicate are inextricably linked.  To 
free one means freedom for the other.  Austen’s novel examines the 
premise that if women’s creative efforts are to escape the discourse of 
mastery, we must begin to write the feminine body.  The textual 
production of feminine writings is an experiment which, in order to refute 
the psychoanalytic assertion that woman does not exist, aims at 
challenging the notion of deficiency and inferiority with the positive 
affirmation of female subjectivity.  To write from one’s body is to flee 
reality, to escape the hierarchal bonds of repression by inscribing a 
language that does not hold back, but instead makes possibilities limitless 
and heterogeneous.  By writing the feminine body, Austen deconstructs 
and recasts the pervasive, one-dimensional logic of a misogynistic culture.  
She challenges socio-cultural conventions through a practice where 
difference is conceived in positive terms, rather than in terms of  
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opposition.  Taking the difference between the sexes seriously, Austen 
comes to model a new definition of gender relations. 
           I argue that Austen’s feminine text frees women from sexual and 
historical roles that have reduced them to “half-humankind” (Henderson 
& McManus 3).  Austen invents a new writing that allows women to 
transform history and to seize the occasion to speak.  Austen’s novel seeks 
a method of writing that places experience before language and 
communicates that which literally embodies the female, as an inscription  
of the feminine and female difference in language and text.  Women are 
struggling to find a terminology that rescues the feminine from its  
stereotypical associations with inferiority.  Austen creates such a language 
and changes the climate of the written word.  Out of the experience of 
women’s oppression, Austen’s Pride and Prejudice makes it possible for 
men like  Fitzwilliam Darcy to “de-construct” (Tolson 19) the socially pre-
formed attitudes and behaviors of patriarchy that are routines of daily 
existence.  Though Darcy’s masculinity and personal experiences are 
necessarily socially constructed, his identity is interwoven with the 
ideology of “free-individuality” (Tolson 145).  Austen’s novel invites 
change and rejects the impulse to compromise or destroy the other’s 
uniqueness and individuality in order to construct a selfhood based on a 
masculine position of dominance.  
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           This essay seeks to explore the social construction of gender in 
individuals with particular emphasis on Jane Austen’s Mr. Darcy.  In 
Chapter 1, I will examine the institutional aspects and reasons that 
contribute to gender formation.  The question is asked as to whether 
masculinity is the problem in gender politics—specifically in the 
oppression and subordination of women—or whether it is the 
institutional measures implemented by a patriarchal society that produce 
inequality.  I will seek to explain some of the mystery surrounding  
Austen’s most famous male protagonist, Fitzwilliam Darcy, the reasons 
and justifications for his arrogance and over-developed pride.  I hope to  
prove that Austen’s Mr. Darcy is a product of the social construction of 
gender and that his actions and attitudes reflect an ideology founded on 
gendered power relations that are preserved, guarded, and passed on to 
future generations of males.   
           In Chapter 2, I will examine the social construction of the individual 
with a focus on the citizens of Meryton in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.  I 
will endeavor to show that the everyday reality of Jane Austen’s 
characters is socially constructed, that each is a product of a socio-cultural 
determinism as they reflect social institutions and represent cultural 
conventions.   
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           Finally, Chapter 3 will reveal the ways in which language and 
discourse establish and maintain the basic gender identity that produces 
female inferiority and male supremacy.  The latent correlations between 
reason, truth, and masculinity, on the one hand, and between emotion, 
error, and femininity, on the other, will be explored in relation to the 
deeply embedded and prevalent notions of gender that lie shrouded in the 
history of Western culture and prevent women’s separate destinies.   
More importantly in Chapter 3, I will seek to explain the rhetorical devices 
and techniques that Jane Austen uses to transcend traditional male-
dominated language and discourse by writing the feminine body, a new 
language inscribed within the feminine text, in an effort to effect change 
and invent a space in which and from which the female voice or 
subjectivity can be heard.  Austen’s feminine rhetorical strategies subvert 
the male text and, consequently, the socially constructed framework 
through which the reader views her characters.  Austen de-constructs the 
repressive structures of thinking that invent gender and generate the 
unequal social status in a patriarchal society.  Finally, Austen de-
constructs Fitzwilliam Darcy and offers us a new manner of masculinity 






The Social Construction of Gender: Masculinity 
and Austen’s Mr. Darcy 
            
           Gender is a human conception much like language, kinship, 
religion, and technology; like these establishments, gender organizes 
human social life in culturally specific patterns.  Gender categorizes social 
interactions in everyday life, as well as in major social structures, such as 
class and the hierarchies maintained in bureaucratic organizations.  The 
social construction of gender in individuals sustains and strengthens 
societal structures; as individuals act out gendered prescripts and 
expectations in the public domain to the most intimate setting, they create 
gendered systems of dominance and power.  These learned patterns of 
gender norms and roles are carried out in everyday life through an arena 
of gender politics, with “masculine” and “feminine” continually 
perpetuated as divergent and oppositional.   
           Sociologists have theorized that men’s and women’s behavior 
generates the unequal social and political status in any society; however, 
this would imply that individual actions construct social institutions and 
that changes in individual behavior would, theoretically, make it possible  
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to break down social institutions.  It is a fact that without individual 
participation, whether voluntary or coerced, there would be no 
institutions, since, as R.W. Connell explains, “the social structures we call 
gender, government, family, economy, and so forth must be enacted 
everyday in order to continue, and in that enactment, are strengthened or 
weakened, sustained or resisted” (43).  Social institutions—except, 
perhaps, in times of revolution and political upheaval—exist prior to the 
individual’s birth, education, and social development.  The intertwining of 
various gendered social structures acutely and continuously shapes the 
lives of individuals beginning at birth, since gender construction starts 
with assignment to a sex group depending on whether the child is a boy 
or a girl.  Through the interplay between gendered personalities and 
identities in a context of social and historical relations, these constructed 
models of masculinity and femininity are internalized and willingly 
performed again and again by each succeeding generation.   
           Once we acknowledge the institutional aspects of gender, it 
becomes difficult to avoid the question: Is it, in reality, masculinity that is 
the problem in gender politics—specifically in the oppression and 
subordination of women—or is it, rather, the institutional measures that 
produce inequality, and thus, cause tensions that have brought 
“masculinity” to the forefront of cultural and sociological analyses?   
         Hamilton 13 
Clearly, the definitions of masculinity are deeply and resolutely enmeshed 
in the history of institutions and of economic structures.  According to 
Michael Kimmel, masculinity is not just an idea or a “‘thing’ that one 
possesses, but a set of activities that one does”; these actions are validated 
and legitimized by the evaluations of others (88).  Kimmel states, “We do 
gender in every interaction, in every situation, in every institution in 
which we find ourselves” (88).  Therefore, gender is less a characteristic of 
the individual than it is an outcome of our interactions with others.  The 
fact that masculinity may modify and fluctuate at different periods in 
history and in different cultures does not mean that gender is a transient 
quality which is sometimes present and sometimes not.  How men 
conduct themselves will ultimately depend upon the existing social 
interactions of gender.  By this I mean the way in which men and women 
respond to each other ideologically and politically.  Moreover, masculinity 
can never exist apart from femininity; it will always be a demonstration of 
the current image that men have of themselves in relation to women.  
            Gender roles are not organized in a contingent or random manner, 
nor do we simply inherit a male or female sex role.  Today, many men 
deviate from what Arthur Brittan refers to as the “breadwinner ethic” (52), 
which was rigorously followed by past generations of males out of a sense  
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of moral principles and prescribed rules of conduct.  These men, in an 
effort to formulate a new definition of masculinity, no longer burden 
themselves with the prescribed expectations of marriage and family.  The 
fact that they are rebelling against socially constructed roles as husbands 
and providers and are pursuing happiness and fulfillment in other ways 
does not necessitate the undermining of their dominance in the political 
and economic spheres, nor does it imply that they have ceded dominance 
in the family and domestic realm.  As Brittan explains, “What has changed 
is not male power as such, but its form, its presentation, its packaging.  In 
other words, while it is apparent that styles of masculinity may alter in 
relatively short time spans, the substance of male power does not” (52).  
Karen D. Pyke asserts that we need to think of masculinity and femininity 
not as a single object with its own history, but as being constantly 
constructed within the history of an evolving social structure that 
sanctions male supremacy and female subjugation (89).  Deeply 
entrenched and often unconscious beliefs about the nature of men and 
women shape how gender is perpetuated in everyday life.  Because these 
beliefs are formed by preceding power structures, the culturally 
acceptable means of producing gender prejudices men’s interests over 
those of women.  Thus, gendered power relations are not only 
maintained, but also reproduced.  
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           Jane Austen is, perhaps, exceptional in the extent to which she 
illustrates the molding of human character, for good or bad.  Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice reflects with startling accuracy a world in which social 
interactions are the substance of everyday life, and which, because these 
exchanges are acted out within recognized systems of power relations, 
affect the balance of interests in society.  Juliet McMaster states “Austen 
registers exactly the social provenance of each of her characters, and 
judges them for the ways in which they judge each other” (“Class” 129).  
Rachel Brownstein states that Austen’s novel depicts the concerns of a 
culture in change, which debated the nature of authority and personal 
distinction, and the value of the sentient self (35).  But more important for 
a writer of this time period, Austen cleverly suggests the inequitable 
gender ideals of the late eighteenth-century as closely related to the 
broader values of the society in which they were produced, a society 
which endorsed and naturalized women’s relative powerlessness and 
oppression in connection to a larger enterprise of maintaining an 
authoritarian social order.  Austen’s novel delicately describes the 
disappointments and adjustments that define the feminine experience.  
Carol Houlihan Flynn adds further confirmation of Austen’s feminist 
concerns by explaining that “Austen’s many letters, fragmented and 
broken, expose the difficulties that she and other women faced under a  
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system of checks and repressions” (101).   Moreover, the first sentence of 
Pride and Prejudice is a statement belying the social construction of the 
individual as alluded to in the status symbols and cultural markers of 
Austen’s society: the estates; the marriages and conventions; the wealth, 
or lack of; but also in the inequalities of class and gender.  Austen writes: 
“It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of 
a good fortune, must be in want of a wife” (1).   
           In Pride and Prejudice, Fitzwilliam Darcy’s over-developed pride 
stems from an acute consciousness of his family’s wealth and social 
station, but also from deeply embedded and socially constituted ideas 
about the nature and meaning of masculinity in a patriarchal society.  
Austen’s Mr. Darcy is a product of the social construction of gender.  
Darcy’s actions and self-presentation typify society’s institutions and 
conventions; his identity and behavior reflect a historicity and ideology 
founded on gendered power relations.  His is the ideology of patriarchy 
which guarantees the hegemonic position of men and the subordination of 
women.    
           Masculinity cannot exist outside history and culture.  Victor Seidler 
asserts that the habit of ascribing some sort of exalted power to 
masculinity is ingrained in the logic of Western culture (40). This  
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pervasive philosophy which justifies male superiority, also rationalizes 
the myth that there is a fundamental difference between men and women.  
It promotes without question the sexual division of labor and sanctions 
the hierarchal position of men in the political and economic spheres of 
everyday public and private life as normal and appropriate.  Moreover, 
masculine ideology tends to be relatively resistant to change, although, as 
noted, aspects of men’s behavior often do fluctuate over time.  R. W. 
Connell explains that what he refers to as “‘hegemonic masculinity’ is not 
a fixed character type, always and everywhere the same.  It is rather, the 
masculinity [or behavior] that occupies the hegemonic position in a given 
pattern of gender relations” (76).  The concept of “hegemony” derives 
from Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of class relations which refers to the 
cultural phenomenon by which a group claims and sustains a leading 
position in social life (Gramsci 110).  “‘Hegemonic masculinity’ can thus 
be understood as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the 
currently accepted explanation to a problem of the legitimacy of 
patriarchy” (Connell 76), thus securing the authoritarian position of men.  
Granted, men themselves are historically exploited by other men, and to 
presume that a dominant group’s ideology is inevitably imposed upon 
everyone else or that women are collectively forced to accept the 
preeminence of men as a natural component of everyday life is a coarse  
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form of belief that presupposes that what Michael Kimmel terms as 
“masculinism” is some sort of monumental worldview which is formed 
by a governing group to validate its claims to rule (88).   
           Nevertheless, there exist historically and in the present, gender 
relations in which the power of men is taken for granted, not only in the 
public, but in the domestic realm as well.  Kimmel states that masculinism 
is reproduced and reaffirmed at any given moment in the home, in the 
economy, and in the polity (88).  Although the number of men practicing a 
hegemonic pattern of behavior may be relatively small, the majority of 
men do gain from the enterprise, since they benefit from what R. W. 
Connell calls the “patriarchal dividend”—“the advantage men in general 
gain from the overall subordination of women” (78).  Even when there is a 
great deal of gender and sexual experimentation, such as was observed in 
the nineteen sixties and early seventies, masculinism was never in real 
jeopardy because gender relations continued relatively undisturbed, 
although, women did make strides in education.  
           Men occupying a hegemonic masculinity are asserting a position of 
power.  They accomplish this by “winning the consent” (Connell 81) of 
other males and females in order to maintain control.  Men are able to 
position other men in a hierarchal system through social stratification in  
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the institutions of class and economics.  If we consider aspects of gender 
construction as having a degree of “free individualism” and autonomy as  
Borden P. Bowne states (367), and with which I concur, then many 
different styles of masculine behavior can be present in the same 
hegemonic institution.   
           In Austen’s novel, the reader is presented with copious and assorted 
types of masculine characters: the acerbic Mr. Bennet, a man of some 
property, but much lower in the social hierarchy than Mr. Darcy; the 
good-natured and cheerful, but new monied Mr. Bingley; and the kindly, 
sensible merchant Mr. Gardner; as well as the more insidious and 
repelling varieties of manhood, such as Wickham and Mr. Collins.  This 
plurality of masculinities is produced through individual life histories that 
involve family background, peer groups, and other social experiences.  
Connell argues that in exploring how “different masculinities are 
constituted in relation to other masculinities and to femininities through 
the structure of gender relations” (736), the problems of class, race, and 
global inequality might be better understood.  Gender relations are a vital 
part of social structure as a whole, and gender politics are among the 
primary determinants of our everyday reality. 
           Jane Austen’s Mr. Darcy is a representation of hegemonic 
masculinity in Pride and Prejudice.  Rather, his manner and actions occupy  
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the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations; his 
everyday experiences are located in the broad framework of patriarchy.   
To be an adult male is to inhabit a distinct, almost venerated space in the 
world; it is to possess a physical presence that is valued and cared for.  
Austen writes, “Mr. Darcy soon drew the attention of the room by his fine, 
tall person, handsome features, [and] noble mien” (16).  Even Mr. Bennet, 
and Mr. Collins, though their character is clearly portrayed as dubious, 
command a certain respect merely because they are part of the patriarchy, 
as does the scandalous Wickham—at least in the first chapters of Austen’s 
novel.  R. W. Connell states that “Gender differentiation is not simply a 
function of socialization, capitalist production, or patriarchy, but is 
grounded in a sex dimorphism that serves the fundamental purpose of 
reproduction” (51).  The body is undeniable in the construction of gender, 
but what is obvious is only part of the development of the individual.  
Males and females at birth experience the bodily process and immediately 
assume an identity and value by way of whether the twenty-third 
chromosome is a double X, as in a female, or an X and a Y, as in the male.  
Children quickly enter into the social process and become part of a 
collective history that has been influenced by social symbolism and 
control.  Austen’s Mr. Darcy is young, handsome, and justifiably proud of 
his tastes, standards, wealth, and pedigree.  His family, long established,  
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dutiful, but untitled landowners, are “respectable, honorable, and 
ancient” (Austen 356).  Juliet McMaster explains that “their income is from 
land, inheritance, and rent-roll” (“Class” 117-118).   
           And unlike Mr. Bennet who takes no interest in the land or the 
management of the property and has no tenants, Mr. Darcy has a long-
term commitment to the land, which makes good stewards and moral 
aristocrats (“Class” 117-118).  Darcy’s friend, Mr. Bingley, seems 
indifferent to establishing permanent ownership of an estate such as 
Netherfeld Manor.  The amiable Mr. Bingley has not developed a sense of 
pride and obligation to the preservation of place and tradition.  His is a 
much more urban mindset formed by an entrepreneurial culture on the 
verge of commercial capitalism; his social ethics are a byproduct of the 
early industrial revolution and the accumulation of wealth from sources 
other than the land.  These “new capitalists,” such as Bingley, were the 
predecessors of a new style of masculinity, which Connell refers to as a 
“calculating masculinity,” and which created and legitimized new forms 
of gendered work and power relations (188).  In Austen’s world, Darcy is 
the moral and social ideal—the country gentleman.  The adulation and 
respect he receives from others simply by virtue of the property he owns 
serves to confirm his dominant role in the social structure of Regency 
England.  Darcy’s superior education, which, according to historian   
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G. E. Mingay, was the best that was available for the time (131), and which 
is evident in his keen interest in reading, and in his family’s extensive 
library collection are material reminders of his wealth, power, and high 
social status.  
                 “I am astonished,” said Miss Bingley, “that my father should 
                 have left so small a collection of books.  What a delightful library 
                 you have at Pemberley, Mr. Darcy!” 
                 “It ought to be good,” he replied, “It has been the work of many 
                 generations.” 
                 “And then you have added so much to it yourself, you are 
                 always buying books.” 
                 “I cannot comprehend the neglect of a family library in such 
                 days as these.” (Austen, Pride 67) 
 
His words may be taken as those of a proprietor, a man who has 
knowledge of the finer things and a sense of his responsibility as the 
successor of a great estate (Brower, “Controlling” 58).  Moreover, his quick 
thinking and successful efforts to find Lydia after she elopes with the 
disreputable Mr. Wickham in the second half of Pride and Prejudice is also 
a reliable indicator in determining the degree of direct male dominance, 
for as any man will attest, men view having information as a form of 
hierarchy.  R. W. Connell states, “Men who possess more information are 
further up the hierarchy” (3).  Clearly Fitzwilliam Darcy, a member of the 
landed gentry, possesses the resources and the knowledge needed to 
resolve the crisis.  The admiration for Darcy quickly wanes, however, as  
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his “proud” acts at the opening ballroom scene are interpreted as arrogant 
and mean.  Austen writes: 
                 Mr. Darcy soon drew the attention of the room by his fine, tall 
                 person, handsome features, noble mien; and the report which 
                 was in general circulation within five minutes after his entrance, 
                 of his having ten thousand a year.  The gentlemen pronounced 
                 him to be a fine figure of a man, the ladies declared he was much 
                 handsomer than Mr. Bingley, and he was looked at with great 
                 admiration for about half the evening, till his manners gave a 
                 disgust which turned the tide of his popularity; for he was 
                 discovered to be proud, to be above his company, and above 
                 being pleased; and not all his large estate in Derbyshire could 
                 then save him from having a most forbidding, disagreeable 
                 countenance, and being unworthy to be compared with his 
                 friend.  . . . His character was decided. (Pride 16) 
            
That Darcy is acting out the learned patterns of hegemonic masculinity is 
taken as snobbery; his social provenance and wealth are consequently 
viewed by Elizabeth and other female characters as the defining condition 
in Darcy’s life that, as Juliet McMaster says, “overrides all other categories 
of judgment, physical, intellectual, or moral” (“Class” 128-129).  He later 
offers an explanation for his behavior in a statement to Elizabeth: 
                 I have been a selfish being all my life, in practice, though not in 
                 principle.  As a child I was taught what was right, but I was not 
                 taught to correct my temper.  I was given good principles, but 
                 left to follow them in pride and conceit.  Unfortunately an only 
                 son, [. . .] I was spoilt by my parents, who though all good 
                 themselves, [. . .] allowed, encouraged, almost taught me to be 
                 selfish and overbearing, to care for none beyond my own family 
                 circle, to think meanly of all the rest of the world, to wish at least 
                 to think meanly of their sense and worth compared with my 
                 own.  Such I was, from eight to eight and twenty. (Pride 282) 
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G. K. Chesterton states that in finally acknowledging his faults, Darcy gets 
nearer to a complete confession of the hegemonic male “than was ever  
portrayed in the Bronte heroes or the elaborate exculpations of George 
Eliot” (20).   
           What Elizabeth and the citizens of Meryton fail to realize is that 
Darcy is simply following the instruction manual provided by society and 
history, the one we all use to construct our identity.  A compromise 
between a biological determinism and a social determinism will never do 
as the basis for an account of gender, yet we cannot ignore either the 
radically cultural character of gender or the bodily presence.  The social 
construction of gender is ultimately about relationships based on power, 
the power of men over women, which is the basis of the feminist 
perspective on gender. But the practices of power are layered and 
interwoven in society, and gender dominance and its ideological 
justification include not only the exploitation of women, but also the 
subordination and denigration of other men.       
           Philip Carter explains that even a subject like male dancing reveals 
the ways in which the “polite arts” were compatible with established 
concepts of masculinism and patriarchal ideology.  Carter states that John 
Locke, an early advocate of incorporating dancing into the education of 
the gentry, thought it contributed not only to gentility, but to “above all  
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things masculine,” by which he meant hardiness, confidence, and mental 
and physical poise (73).  Similar attention to the practice of traditional 
manliness is evident in discussions of men’s conversation.  The good 
conversationalist was regularly depicted as thoughtful, well-read, and 
quick thinking (73).  The polite gentleman of Regency England,  
according to Carter, attempted to redefine and affirm his manliness by 
attempting to minimize or “alleviate the marginalization of women” that 
had been witnessed in so called less civilized societies by mixing in female 
society.  This “new manner of being men,” as Andrew Tolson refers to the 
changes in masculine behavior during this period (18), supposedly 
lessened men’s superiority over women and, thus, such men discovered 
their authority “through acts of generosity, complaisance and gallantry” 
(Carter 74).  Of course, these same men, while narrowing the behavior gap 
between the genders, continued to preserve their manliness by displaying 
a façade of greater rationality and intelligence than the majority of women 
with whom they socialized and to demonstrate their patriarchal authority 
through a display of traditional male qualities—naturally greater physical 
and mental strength, for example—to which, as we have seen, succeeding 
standards of gender inequality remain indebted.  This “new manner of 
being men” (Tolson 18) was invariably characterized as an idealized 
correspondence between, rather than a synthesis of, the sexes (Carter 74). 
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           David Morgan explains that rationality is associated with the 
practice of ideal men, with the public sphere, and with those individuals 
most visibly and actively involved in public life.  It is associated with the 
logic of the marketplace, with the dominant principle of public 
institutions, and with the conduct of the domestic realm (70).  The idea of 
rationality is a central theme of modern cultural history that incorporates 
both class and gender, forming a basic feature of hegemonic masculinity 
and furthering efforts to legitimize patriarchy.  While patriarchy is an 
ancient phenomenon in Western culture, Anthony Rotundo states that 
almost everything we know about human behavior historically concerns 
men, yet ironically, “we know far more about womanhood and the female 
role than we know about masculinity or the man’s role” (35).  Rotundo 
explains that women’s historians in the last two decades have shown the 
importance of gender as a “system of power relations, a pattern of social 
relationships and a cultural construct of profound influence” (35).  As 
capitalism began to expand at the end of the eighteenth-century, the ideal 
of manhood urged men to actively participate in existing social structures 
and to take advantage of its opportunities—opportunities that were male-
centered.  The ideal male was presented as naturally active, influential, 
and commanding.  Strong, aggressive action coupled with ceaseless effort 
and dogged persistence was considered vital to the cult of masculinity.   
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           For a man to retain distinction and authority in an increasingly 
competitive environment, men such as Fitzwilliam Darcy had to be 
independent in thought and action, and “compelled to think and act for 
themselves” (Rotundo 37).  But more importantly, these models of 
supreme masculinity had to be clear-headed and rational; thus, the 
restraint of excessive emotion was emphasized.  R. W. Connell points out 
that what he refers to as “hegemonic masculinity established its 
hegemony partly by its claim to embody the power of reason” (165).  
Connell asserts, “It is a mistake to identify hegemonic masculinity purely 
with physical aggression” (165).  According to Rotundo, the prescripts 
imposed upon the socially constructed male were those equated with 
accomplishment, both personal and material, and autonomy, as well as 
aggressive economic relations in the production for the markets and in 
extraction of rents (37).   
           Austen’s Mr. Darcy is a rich man; his 10,000 per year places his 
family in the upper level of landed gentry.  The fact that the landed classes 
formed an elite and were habitually accustomed to receiving respect and 
praise from the community at large was the natural mind-set of an era in 
which each man knew his place in society and acknowledged his 
superiors who, in reality, were superior simply by reason of their superior 
education, style, authoritative manner, and above all, wealth, and who  
         Hamilton 28 
were acknowledged as such because they claimed the rights of their 
ancestry and social position with self-assurance.  The patriarchal ways of 
the landed classes had a social basis in the acceptance of aristocratic 
authority and an economic basis in the dependence of farmers, servants, 
and the laboring poor on the patronage of individual land owners.  In 
light of the profound impact in Europe of the French Revolution and the 
fear of rebellion in other countries during this same period, ideas of 
equality, at least for a short time, gave way to rank and title.  Therefore, 
new capitalists, such as Austen’s Mr. Bingley looked to traditional 
authority represented in men like Darcy, as the only reliable guardian of 
order and property in a time of great unrest.    
           Fitzwilliam Darcy has been instructed from birth to fulfill an 
inherited position of authority; his class and gender converge in the 
concept of “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell 76).  Pauline Hunt explains 
that “individuals are born into social classes, but they are socialized into 
their class position” (9).  This process of socialization, including learning 
gender, occurs within the family unit making Darcy a proud participant in 
a collective experience and shared fate.  His consciousness is historically 
imbued in, and by, his ancestry with a desire to preserve and improve 
society.  Alistair Duckworth provides insight into the social code of the 
landed gentry as being the “responsible commitment of an individual to a  
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heritage”, a heritage that “though basically sound, is in danger of 
becoming static and moribund without ‘improvement’” (x).  Mr. Darcy is 
the product of a hierarchal organization that promotes inequalities of 
power.  David Morgan explains that these sets of differences are 
“structured in that they, to a greater or lesser extent, exist outside 
individuals and persist over time” (165).   
           I do not wish to infer that the idea of socialization is a process 
imposed upon a passive recipient; rather, I argue that once gender and  
class identity solidifies, the child, from that time on, structures experience 
in accordance with his or her socially constructed identity.  Once firmly 
established, gender and class identity become a basic means by which 
lived experiences are defined and enacted.  Thus, working class boys learn 
to accept as natural a lifetime as wage earners; landed gentry boys learn 
that their world is one of opportunity and power; their sisters learn to 
accept as natural a lifetime, as Hunt asserts, “as adjuncts to the male” (9).  
Austen’s hero, while remaining faithful to inherited and learned patterns 
of behavior, must ultimately achieve a level of “self-individualism” 
(Bowne 367) before he can transcend the trappings of his own social class.  
Darcy’s accountability and resourcefulness in the face of adversity reveal 
attitudes and behaviors that remain the positive and estimable virtues of 
Darcy’s, as yet, undiscovered depth and maturity that are revealed in the  
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second half of Pride and Prejudice.   Despite the eventual, steady erosion of 
the general social basis from the weight of economic expansion, Austen’s 
little world of the country house continued in its patriarchal ways well 
into the twentieth-century when it was shattered by the disintegration of 
the large estates, servant shortages, surtaxes, and unionized farm laborers.  
Though Austen’s moral vision was grounded in tradition and manifested 
ideally in the structure of the estate, she understood that the formal and 
static facade of authority should be balanced by individual energy.   
R. W. Connell states that with the eighteenth-century, England and North 
America witnessed the construction of a gender order in which 
masculinity in the modern sense was crystallized and consolidated.  
“Gendered individual character, defined through an opposition with 
femininity and institutionalized in economy and state” (189), was 
embodied in the landed gentry who dominated the North Atlantic world 
of the 1700s.   The state and its institutions were controlled by these great 
families through patronage, thus perpetuating the hierarchal structure of 
society.  Land ownership was rooted in kinship; a man’s lineage was as 
important to his personal identity as his class and wealth.  There was a 
strong ethic of family honor and duty, and affronts to a man’s honor were 
taken very seriously.  Darcy’s sensibilities are cut to the core when  
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Elizabeth accuses him of not acting honorably towards her.  He agonizes 
over his failure to uphold his own social code.  He states: 
                 I cannot be so easily reconciled to myself.  The recollection of 
                 what I then said, of my conduct, my manners, my expressions 
                 during the whole of it, is now, and has been many months, 
                 inexpressibly painful to me.  Your reproof, so well applied, I 
                 shall never forget: ‘had you behaved in a more gentleman-like 
                 manner.’ Those were your words. You know not, you can 
                 scarcely conceive, how they have tortured me; [. . . .] 
                 (Austen, Pride 281)  
 
This scene from Austen’s novel portrays the conflict of ideals seen in the 
social code of the landed classes.  Darcy understands full well the 
definitions of gentleman-like behavior and patriarchal duty.  His 
treatment of Elizabeth in his first marriage proposal, however, is 
condescending and degrading; thus, exposing the true nature of the 
hegemonic male’s respect and valorization of womanhood.  Gentry 
masculinity involved domestic authority over women, though women 
were involved in making and maintaining the community alliances that 
tied the gentry together; the strategies lovingly scrutinized in Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice.     
           Though they are unaware of the fact, women are producers of 
masculinity.  Just as society constructs gender, so women contribute to the 
production and reproduction of male identity and, thus, a patriarchal 
social structure.  Elizabeth’s delight over the prospect of becoming  
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mistress of Pemberley, despite her initial disgust for Darcy’s exceeding 
pride, reveals the reality of Elizabeth’s world in that to be a woman and 
end up a penniless old maid was to assure oneself of a life of hardship and 
dependence on reluctant family members.  For femininity too is 
constructed; women perpetuate the gender norms of a hegemonic society 
reaffirming the entrenched power structures of domination and 
subordination that pushed women into the home and dismissed their 
claims of equality.  Charlotte’s resolve to marry a man who Elizabeth 
views as ridiculous and uninteresting is never quite resolved in the mind 
of Austen’s heroine.  Charlotte’s actions illustrate the paradox of gender 
construction in that Charlotte, who at first seems to possess an 
individualism and freedom of mind, eventually demonstrates 
complacency and indifference, thus forfeiting the possibility of a 
meaningful relationship for the more trivial, materialistic advantages of 
the social world.  Elizabeth states: 
                 She had always felt that Charlotte’s opinion of matrimony was 
                 not exactly like her own, but she could not have supposed it 
                 possible that, when called into action, she would have sacrificed 
                 every better feeling to worldly advantage.  (Austen, Pride 96) 
 
Charlotte allows Mr. Collins to consume her identity and self-worth; she 
becomes comfortably ensconced in the only society she knows, a society 
where men’s interests and needs are groomed and nurtured and women’s  
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are conveniently overlooked or cast aside—thus keeping the ideology of 
masculinity firmly intact.  McMaster asserts that for Elizabeth, it seems 
fitting that her eventual “adjusted view” (Achievement 72) of Darcy 
involves the material trappings of his social role, since for Jane Austen, 
character (whether male or female) is “completed in society” (Simpson 
14).    
           Alistair Duckworth states that for Jane Austen, in Pride and 
Prejudice, “the estate as an ordered physical structure is a metonym for 
other structures—society as a whole, a code of morality, a body of 
manners, a system of language—and ‘improvements,’ or the manner in 
which individuals relate to their cultural inheritance” are a way of 
determining responsible from irresponsible behavior (ix).  Juliet McMaster 
states that many critics have pointed out that Austen’s depiction of 
Pemberley is a “covert description of Darcy’s character” (Achievement 71); 
it is clearly a reminder of his wealth and social status, but more 
importantly a visible manifestation of his masculinity.  Austen writes: 
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                 It was a large, handsome, stone building, standing well on rising 
                 ground, and back by a ridge of high woody hills; - and in front, a 
                 stream of some natural importance was swelled into greater, but 
                 without any artificial appearance.  Its banks were neither formal, 
                 nor falsely adorned.  Elizabeth was delighted.  She had never 
                 seen a place for which nature had done more, or where natural 
                 beauty had been so little counteracted by an awkward taste. 
                 They were all of them warm in their admiration; and at that 
                 moment she felt, that to be mistress of Pemberley might be 
                 something!  (Pride 245) 
 
Pemberley stands as a monument to the upper class male’s patriarchal 
right of inheritance.  Women in the eighteenth century, such as Elizabeth 
Bennet, were at the mercy of either a male sibling or constrained to marry 
up in station, since the father’s property could never be left to his 
daughters.  From inside the house, Elizabeth provides a pleasing view of 
Pemberley from a window: 
                 Every disposition of the ground was good; and she looked on 
                 the whole scene, the river, the trees scattered on its banks, and 
                 the winding of the valley, as far as she could trace it, with 
                 delight.  As they passed into other rooms, these objects were 
                 taking different positions; but from every window there were 
                 beauties to be seen.  The rooms were lofty and handsome, and 
                 their furniture suitable to the fortune of their proprietor; but 
                 Elizabeth saw, with admiration of his taste, that it was neither 
                 gaudy nor uselessly with less of splendor, and more real 
                 elegance, than the furniture of Rosings. (Pride 246)   
 
Darcy’s physical environment must be taken into account when studying 
his character; his house, or his “shell” (McMaster, Achievement 72)—to 
borrow from Henry James’s character, Madame Merle, in The Portrait of a  
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Lady—is a part of Darcy’s “whole envelope of circumstances” (Achievement 
72).  James writes: 
                 There’s no such thing as an isolated man or woman; we’re each 
                 of us made up of some cluster of appurtenances.  What shall we 
                 call our ‘self’?  Where does it begin? Where does it end?  It 
                 overflows into everything that belongs to us—and then it flows 
                 back again.  I know a large part of myself is in the clothes I 
                 choose to wear.  I’ve a great respect for things!  One’s self—for 
                 other people—is one’s expression of one’s self; and one’s house, 
                 one’s furniture, one’s garments, the books one reads, the 
                 company one keeps—these things are all expressive.  (231) 
 
Elizabeth Bennet’s difficult adjustment to reality in the sense that all the 
characters of Austen’s novel exist in a permanently established society, 
her enthusiasm for the “things” at Pemberley, and her positive change of 
heart concerning Darcy’s character emphasize the duality of Austen’s 
mind and viewpoint in her attitude to the attainment of individual 
identity and morality balanced against her acknowledgement of the limits 
and restraints of society.  Pride and Prejudice was written at a point of 
transition between two centuries of thought: eighteenth-century ideas 
testified to a world that was divinely structured and essentially ordered, 
while the nineteenth-century saw a loss of faith in any spiritual 
foundation for society or individual existence and a shift towards a 
reliance on the self as the only determinant of order and value.  In the last 
lines of Pride and Prejudice, we realize that Elizabeth has become part of  
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Pemberley and its heritage, and the stable self remains exactly where 
Austen would have it, in the center of a stable eighteenth-century world. 
           The history of masculinity is often related to ideas of paternal 
inheritance, recollections of group solidarity, and experience with physical 
labor.  Andrew Tolson explains that men place great importance in talking 
about their antecedents, their property, their work, and find reassurance 
in the fact that they can “project [themselves] into the past” (14).  History 
can affirm a man’s legacy and “can invoke the ancient law of patriarchy: 
the continuing symbolic power associated with property inheritance, 
organization of the family, and the maintenance of male supremacy” (14).  
This history becomes enmeshed in the unconscious minds of men with 
regularity and persistence through a “passing on” to each succeeding 
generation; it predisposes itself in the form of attitudes and temperaments 
deep beneath the surface of an individual’s, even a whole culture’s 
awareness.  Patriarchy is a powerful anachronism and supplies men with 
a point of reference for the formation of identity in the masculine gender, 











                   The Socially Constructed Characters in Pride and Prejudice  
               
           The sociology of knowledge is the knowledge that guides conduct 
in everyday life.   It concerns the everyday or commonsense 
understanding that is constructed at different levels of society all the way 
from language, to family history and memories, to human sexuality and 
social status, to formal theories and paradigms, and finally to what is 
called symbolic universes or over-arching world views.  Everyday life 
presents itself as a reality to be interpreted by men and women as a 
meaningful and coherent world.  The world of everyday life is not only 
taken for granted as reality by the average members of society as they 
carry out their daily routine; it is a world that originates in their thoughts 
and actions and is perpetually maintained as real by these same conscious 
human processes.  Everyday life intrudes upon consciousness in the most 
pressing, all-consuming manner.  It cannot be disregarded, and its 
overbearing presence is hard to weaken.  Consequently, it forces people’s 
attention to it in the most intense way.  Our daily experience is a common 
one of existing in and apprehending the reality of everyday life, and this is 
accepted as normal and self-evident.  
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           The basic ideology behind constructionist scholarship has been in 
place since Karl Marx, at least for the key points.  David R. Maines 
explains that the social construction of meaning, which I will refer to in 
this analysis as the sociology of knowledge, is a study that examines the 
core of the sociological endeavor questioning crude essentialisms and 
models of human group existence based on reified constructs that are 
incongruous with what scientists know about the human species (577).  
This particular area of social theory is an intentional turning away from 
the emphases of earlier investigations into the social construction of 
knowledge, which Sergio Sismondo explains are a sort of “sociological 
gloss” on the history of ideas (518), which was developed extensively in 
the 1960s by such philosophers as Michel Foucault (Archeology 137).    
           Sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann state in their 
analysis of the reality of everyday life that a non-human animal lives in a 
largely fixed relationship to its environment which it shares with other 
members of its species.  All non-human animals exist in “closed worlds 
whose structures are predetermined by the biological equipment” of the 
species (46).  The human child, however, is still developing biologically, 
explains Berger and Luckmann, while already established in a 
relationship to its environment; therefore, the process of becoming human 
takes place in an interrelationship with the world around him.  The  
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developing human being not only interrelates with his specific natural 
surroundings, but also with a particular cultural and social order which is 
arbitrated by the “significant others” (Berger & Luckmann 46) who have 
authority over each person and whose possibilities for existing in a world-
openness are pre-empted by social order, direction, and stability.   
          The progress of the human is contingent upon certain social 
arrangements; the direction of development is socially determined.  From 
the moment of birth, a person’s development is subject to continuing 
socially determined interference.  The same social processes that 
determine the completion of the human being also produces the self in its 
particular, culturally relative form.  For “man’s self-production is always, 
and of necessity, a social enterprise” (48).   
           Michel Foucault’s premise in his treatise on the history of ideas is 
congruent with the disciplines incorporated in the sociology of knowledge 
in that Foucault defines the history of ideas as being “concerned with all 
that insidious thought, that whole interplay of representations that flow 
anonymously between men; [. . .] the history of ideas sets out to cross the 
boundaries of existing disciplines, [. . .] to re-interpret them.  [. . .] it relates 
work with institutions, social customs or behaviour, techniques, and 
unrecorded needs and practices.  It becomes therefore the discipline of 
interferences” (Archeology 137).   
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           Humans exhibit a great deal of flexibility in their response to the 
environmental forces at work in their everyday lives.  We are extremely 
vulnerable to socially determined interference.  The inherent instability of 
the human being makes it necessary that the individual provide a constant 
environment for his or her conduct.  This biological truth serves as an 
important premise for the production of social order and the inevitable 
institutionalization of society.  Sergio Sismondo states that the momentum 
of an institution is sustained by socialization and legitimation (520).  He 
explains that institutions endure because a significant portion of society 
understands them to exist and acts accordingly.  This doesn’t make the 
institutions any less real in the minds of the people: we cannot “wish them 
away” (Berger & Luckman 51), and our continued participation 
concretizes the historical processes that first formed these great 
monuments to order and control.   
           Institutionalization takes place through “habitualization,” which, 
according to Berger & Luckmann, is any act that is repeated frequently 
and is directed into a pattern which can be reproduced with very little 
effort (46). Habitualization further means that the action or ongoing 
activity may be performed again in the future in the same way and with 
the same ease of effort.  Habitualization narrows our choices; it provides 
the direction and the specialization of activity that is lacking in the human  
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being’s biological makeup.  Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a 
“reciprocal typification of habitualized actions” performed by varying 
types of human “actors.”  These “actors” construct a “background of 
routine” which ultimately constrains behavior (51).  These typifications of 
habitualized actions that makeup institutions are always shared ones.  
They are accessible to all of the members of a particular social group, and 
the institution characterizes individual group members as well as 
individual actions, thus further substantiating the objective reality of 
everyday life.  The reality of Jane Austen’s characters in Pride and Prejudice 
is socially constructed; their goals and actions become a typification of 
society’s institutions and conventions.  By examining a number of 
Austen’s main characters, with a particular focus on the character  
Fitzwilliam Darcy, the reader learns that each is a product of a socio-
cultural determinism as they reflect social institutions and represent 
cultural conventions.  The social interactions and relationships acted out 
between Austen’s Mr. Darcy and the citizens of Meryton illuminate the 
unequal and divergent social and political institutions that have been 
habitualized in Austen’s world.    
                 My argument for the socially constructed individual in Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice can be summed up in the character of  
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Fitzwilliam Darcy.  His name, his family’s lineage, and the grandeurs of 
Pemberley identify him as a well-to-do Northern landlord at a time when 
territorial influence, especially in the wide-open spaces of the North, was 
still all-powerful (Chapman 188).  The estate of Pemberley is symbolic of a 
whole social and moral inheritance, and Darcy’s wealth (10,000 pounds 
per year) is of primary significance in Pride and Prejudice.  Jane Austen’s 
novel is liberally sprinkled with references to the institution of money 
(Heldman 38).  Characters are defined by their incomes and fortunes as 
much as by their appearances and manners.  Suitors are eligible or not 
mainly because of their incomes.   
           Austen was not so cynical as to believe that money could ensure 
happiness, but she was a realist and understood that a sufficient income 
was vital to the security of any marriage (38).  Darcy’s initial refusal to act 
against his nature in Pride and Prejudice can be taken as a sign of a man of 
integrity in whom taste and morality are inseparable.  Darcy’s moral 
maturity provides him with a great sense of his own role in society.  He is 
also above mere personal interests.   While his careful upkeep of 
Pemberley—a most perfect property—qualifies him as a competent 
defender of both taste and the institution of the estate, his constant 
standard of good judgment and charity set him apart from the other 
members of Meryton.  Darcy’s sense of duty and responsibility, his  
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methodical nature and respect for tradition, and his strong advocacy of 
class distinction reinforce his unreserved support of society’s doctrines 
and conventions—even Darcy’s carefully executed letters written with 
perfect diction and calligraphy exemplify institutionalization, as does the 
fact that he takes his role as businessman very seriously (Moler 51).  While 
Wickham proves unworthy in his dependence on false manners and 
deceit, Darcy, in the end, proves himself capable and the bearer of a 
sincere heart.  Fitzwilliam Darcy epitomizes neoclassical beliefs in society 
as art, which is evidenced in his family’s exquisite estate and in their 
exemplary collection of art and literature, and his loyalty to place and 
tradition sustains the secure and ordered society (Moler 47).  But Darcy 
also reinforces Austen’s views on compromise and balance in life in order 
that the best of both worlds may be obtained.    
           Society’s institutions are built up in the course of a shared history—
they always have a history of which they are the products.  Institutions, 
simply because of their massive existence, control human behavior by 
setting up already defined patterns of conduct which lead us in one 
certain direction instead of in the many other directions that could be 
theoretically possible.  To say that a sector of human activity has been 
institutionalized is to say that this same sector has been subsumed under 
social control.  The habitualizations and typifications carried out in the  
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person’s common everyday life now become historical situations; the 
institution was there before the human was born and will be there after 
his death.  The institutions that have formed (i.e. language, marriage, 
property, paternity/maternity) now exist over and beyond the individuals 
who take part in them; they are now experienced as having a reality of 
their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and 
coercive reality.   
           In Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice there is a sense of inherited 
security in the institution of the estate into which an individual is born 
and which provides the person with harmony and peace.  The individual 
lives on the property surrounded by family and by others in the 
community.  He or she has lived here for generations.  The individual 
derives a consciousness from the community that is shared and structured 
in all areas. Each person is in possession of a common language and mode 
of behavior.  In the houses and landscape such a community possesses an 
organization that has evolved over a long period of time; it has a history.  
Though it is a human institute, it is secure, complete, and comforting.  It 
seems to be truth.  But if the security is taken away we may find in this 
same secure society the totally unsupported woman reduced to poverty 
and degradation; and as Susan Kneedler states, a victim of the  
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“institutionalization of hostility to women” (29).  For this is the danger 
facing Mrs. Bennet and her girls, that security may become isolation, that 
the institution of the estate and the good opinion of her neighbors may be 
exchanged for life as a governess or servant which in Bronte’s Jane Eyre 
was akin to slavery.  
           The socially produced self cannot be adequately understood apart 
from the specific social context in which the individual is formed and 
defined.  By social context, I mean not only the cultural constructs which 
order everyday life, but also the beliefs we “pass on” to our children and 
were taught ourselves that cause us to value certain achievements and 
impose particular ideals as universal truths.  The characters in Jane 
Austen’s novel, without the conventional reference points of an ordered 
inheritance, feel at a loss on how to act.  Isolated from a secure and 
inherited estate, an individual suffers from more than a loss of status; he 
or she is, more importantly, barred from a center of being and action and 
denied a personal history.  Two subjects are paramount in Mrs. Bennet’s 
life and conversation: the injustice of the entail of Mr. Bennet’s estate to his 
closest male relative, rather than to his wife and daughters, and the 
problem of getting her daughters married.  Out of her obsession with 
these set ideas and void of any caution, wit, or intellect, Mrs. Bennet 
derives all of her functions as wife and mother in Austen’s story.  She  
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continually reveals her inanity and her whole being revolves around an 
intense fear of social dislocation and being sure that her daughters marry 
into money and position.     
           The problem of finding a “single man of large fortune” (Austen 1) to 
marry one of her daughters involves Mrs. Bennet  in the plot of the novel 
much more than the matter of the entailment-this threat serves mainly to 
illuminate the heroine’s attempt at independence and self-reliance.  Mrs. 
Bennet’s opinion of Mr. Collins wavers from extremes of deference to 
indignation since she must consider him either a gain or a loss, a suitor, or 
a holder of the unjust entail—a fact the menacing Mr. Collins has no 
shame in reminding the Bennet family of.  When Elizabeth turns down 
Mr. Collins’s marriage proposal despite her mother’s pleadings, Mrs. 
Bennet’s feelings change from admiration to loathing as she laments over 
her misfortune and the fact that Mr. Collins can’t wait to get his hands on 
Longbourn.    Mrs. Bennet’s shameful vulgarity in discussing Jane’s 
marriage to Bingley convinces Darcy that any association with the Bennet 
girls—for him or Bingley—would be unwise and degrading.  Mrs. 
Bennet’s inadequate intelligence and uncertain temper, her marriage to a 
man who can only despise her, and her persistent, untiring preoccupation 
with the material concerns forced on a woman of her class by a 
controlling, prescriptive society have all combined into one all-important  
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motive: to ensure comfort and security for herself while at the same time 
reinforcing this security by getting her daughters settled in sensible 
marriages.  For life at Longbourn is a game of matrimony, and the Bennet 
girls are the playing pieces.   In Austen’s novel, society can be considered 
as a support and protection for the self, as a body of public manners and 
conventions in accordance with which the self may act.  For Mrs. Bennet, 
every situation in life culminates as a clear affirmation of society; her 
conduct becomes a typification of society’s institutions and beliefs. 
           The reality of the social world is a historical one which comes to the 
new generation of users as a tradition rather than biographical memory.  
The individual’s biography is understood as an episode located within the 
objective history of a society.  The institutions, as historic and objective 
facts, confront the individual as undeniable truths.  The original meaning 
of the institutions is unobtainable to the new generation in terms of 
memory; therefore, it becomes necessary to interpret the meaning to these 
inexperienced individuals in various logical formulas—this is usually a 
job for the primary care givers, guardians or parents.  The explanations 
will have to be consistent and comprehensive with respect to the 
institutional order if they are to be convincing to the new generation.  The 
same story must be told to all the children.  The expanding institutional 
order once again develops a “corresponding canopy of legitimations,  
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stretching over it a protective cover of both cognitive and normative 
interpretation” (Berger & Luckmann 58).  The “legitimations” are learned  
by the new generation, and at the same time these individuals are 
effectively socialized into the institutional order.   
           The more a person’s conduct is institutionalized, the more 
predictable and controlled it becomes.  If socialization into the institutions 
has been successful, coercive strategies may be applied economically and 
selectively as with entailment, class prejudice, shame.  Most of the time, 
however, conduct will occur “spontaneously within the institutionally 
programmed channels” (59).  The more conduct can be taken for granted 
in society, the more the possibilities of a world-openness will recede.  The 
belief that this is how these things are done provides both child and 
parent with a firmness of consciousness.  The institutional world becomes 
controlling in an ever more massive way, and it cannot be overlooked as 
readily.   In Pride and Prejudice, the “mercenary view of marriage” 
(Chapman 191) is proclaimed by several of Austen’s characters, and 
practiced by even more.  Charlotte Lucas defends her acceptance of the 
fortuitous Mr. Collins’s proposal of marriage after Elizabeth condemns 
her for marrying a man she does not love. But the alternative to marriage 
for a penniless woman was to risk the socially useless and economically 
dependent old age that could be Charlotte’s fate if she does not marry Mr.  
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Collins.  Charlotte’s “calculating prudence” (191) directs her to take refuge 
within the controlling, yet supportive institution of marriage—her motive  
is purely survival.  Charlotte understands the reality of her everyday life 
and endeavors to provide a stable environment for herself.  Austen states, 
“Single women have a dreadful propensity for being poor—which is one 
very strong argument in favor of Matrimony” (Letters, 483).  In this 
society, income and property—and ultimately recognition and respect—
are given to men; women are supposed to acquire these things through a 
husband.  The reality of Charlotte’s world is one in which men are 
provided for and women are not; it is a society where one gender is 
valued and the other is dismissed.  Charlotte Lucas’s seemingly 
independent thinking in the beginning chapters of Pride and Prejudice ends 
up being subsumed under social control; her behavior reflects compliance 
with the institutional order. 
           The primary knowledge about the institutional order is knowledge 
on the “pre-theoretical level” (Berger & Luckmann 61).  It is the sum total 
of “what everybody knows” about a social world, a collection of social 
maxims, morals, proverbial bits of wisdom, values and beliefs, and myths, 
the theoretical incorporation of which requires great intellectual stamina.  
On the pre-theoretical level, however, every institution has a “body of 
transmitted recipe knowledge” (61) or knowledge that furnishes the  
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institutionally proper rules of conduct.  Since this knowledge is 
considered as a body of generally valid truths about reality, any radical  
divergence from the institutional order appears as a departure from 
everyday reality.  While such deviation on the part of an individual may 
be labeled as immoral or simply ignorant, all who take part in the 
movement will share an inferior cognitive status within the particular 
society (61-62). 
           The new generation poses a possible problem of compliance, and its 
socialization into the institutional order requires the establishment of 
sanctions.  The institutions must and do claim authority over the 
individual independently of any subjective meanings the individual may 
attach to a particular situation.  The importance of the meaning of the 
institutions must be consistently maintained over individual attempts at 
redefinition.  The children must be “taught to behave” and once taught, 
must be “kept in line.” So must the adults for that matter (Berger & 
Luckmann 59).   In Jane Austen’s novel, Elizabeth Bennet is a 
contradiction.  She does seem to resist customs and institutions at first 
glance; her character is portrayed as individualistic and high-spirited, her 
love of the outdoors suggests a desire for freedom from the constraint, 
and her conduct can be considered a deviation from the pre-set rules of 
everyday reality.  Socially held conventions inhibit her natural impulse,  
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interfere with the dictates of her conscience (for Elizabeth is democratic 
with regards to economic and social standing), and weaken the  
convictions of her uncorrupted mind—but the institutions are there. They 
are external to her, persistent in their reality, whether she likes it or not.  
The institutions resist her attempts to change or evade them; they have 
coercive power over her simply by way of the sheer force of their reality 
and through the control mechanisms that are attached to the most 
important of them.    
           Pride and Prejudice moves from an initial circumstance of probable 
social fragmentation (between classes and between minds in the more  
close-knit context of the home) to a resolution in which the foundations of 
society are reestablished as the principal protagonists come together in the 
institution of marriage.  Only through the education of the hero and 
heroine does the broad gulf between opinions and social positions lessen.  
If the excesses of Elizabeth’s individualism are shown to be lacking—for 
she has not yet obtained a sense of her social role—so, too, is Darcy’s 
arrogant conviction that social status defines value.  Once Elizabeth 
realizes that individualism must find its social limits, and Darcy admits 
that tradition without some semblance of individualism is void of 
fulfillment, does Austen’s novel end satisfactorily.   
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           Through Elizabeth’s development from a private to a social point of 
view, we discover that for Jane Austen an individual’s moral  
responsibility is necessary to an objective society, and that any deviation 
toward a subjective morality is imprudent.  And so it is in the resistance of 
the main character to those forces threatening her world which allows the 
continuity of a vital society.  Considering the irresponsibility of others—
both in the fictional story and in the real world—it is even more important 
for the Austen heroine to support and maintain an inherited structure of 
values and conduct.  There is little disagreement over the fact that Austen 
does cast a critical eye on so called programmed social responses, but she 
also confirms inherited social principles and a commitment to duty.   
           Yet, if one believes that Jane Austen does genuinely affirm the prior 
objective existence of socially constructed moral doctrines and respects 
society’s institutions in her novel, then the view that Austen is an author 
who commits hidden, subversive attacks on society’s values is 
unacceptable.   Austen’s characters lead everyday lives of the typical 
gentlefolk whom Austen chooses to portray, and all of her heroines do 
marry men who are either rich or are in comfortable circumstances.  R. W. 
Chapman states that Austen might well be inclined to reply that she is 
entitled, that out of duty she is bound to secure her main characters the 
felicity they deserve since a good income was a condition of happiness. 
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Romantic convention demanded that the eighteenth-century novel end on 
a prospect of lifelong happiness and good fortune, and Austen loved the 
characters in Pride and Prejudice far too much to allow any real tragedy to 
befall their future—she referred to her novel as her “own darling child” 
(Chapman 186).  The reader should look at Pride and Prejudice in light of 
the cultural constructs of the eighteenth-century and consider the pattern 
of her plots, not as an expression of compliance, but as an indication of 
Austen’s outlook on society and on the individual’s place in society.   For 
Austen’s determined attempt is not one of forceful protest, but one of 
accommodating reason and feeling, of rendering sympathy without 
advocating rebellion.  She ultimately supports tradition and external 
authority over unbridled individualism, and in the end, is positive about 
the real values and principles of her world.   The Englishman’s great fear 
of the consequences of the French Revolution defeated any notion that 
goodness could be found in the undisciplined human nature.  Austen’s 
serious concern over the state and continuity of the social structure is not 
to be doubted.  She is concerned with place and tradition and with the 
relation of the individual to his or her history and inheritance.   Alistair 
Duckworth states, “The strength of the novel is like that of Antaeus; it 
depends upon frequent contact with the ground” (34).  The ungrounded 
use of the imagination is treacherous for the writer of fiction and 
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boundaries should be considered when writing (34).  These limitations are 
proof that there is a center to reality aside from the subjective individual 
mind.   In Austen’s close attention to physical fact, in her fidelity to truth, 
she proclaims her belief in man’s freedom to create within a prior order—
the order that is inherent in a society.  Her originality as an author, like the 
individualism of Elizabeth Bennet, finally respects the order and social 
constructs of society.  Her careful attention to detail in Pride and Prejudice 
takes on something of an ontological importance (Duckworth 34). 
           Man’s humanity and his sociality are inextricably intertwined.  The 
separation and uncertainty that Austen’s heroine feels in Pride and 
Prejudice is followed by a reinstatement into society as she comes to a 
mutual understanding with Mr. Darcy.  Moreover, her heroine is 
ultimately located in a properly ordered space for her socially responsible 
activities, in a “suitable, becoming, characteristic situation” (Chapman 8) 
such a Pemberley.  And while Austen’s plot does move in the direction of  
division and subjectivism in Elizabeth’s—and Darcy’s—refusal to conform 
to certain stereotypes and conventions associated with courtship and 
marriage, it also, in the end, affirms a rapprochement between self and 
society.  Often it appears that Austen’s plot resolutions are acts of “bad 
faith” (Duckworth 9), and the reader questions whether she is a heretic to  
          
             Hamilton 55 
her own early acknowledgments of the inadequacy of society.  But in 
finally stating that society is the proper backdrop for individual conduct, 
Austen escapes the problem of achieving balance outside of collapsing—
yet comforting—conventions.  Clearly all of Austen’s characters in Pride 
and Prejudice live in a reality that is socially constructed.  Their thoughts 
and actions are affirmations of the controlling presence of society’s 
conventions and institutions.  Knowledge about society for the individual 
is a realization in the double sense of the word, in the sense of 
apprehending the objective social reality, and in the sense of continually 
producing this reality—and don’t we all today, in the twenty-first-century, 
find ourselves just like the citizens of Meryton still “passing on” the 
tradition?  
           Duckworth states, “The manners of one age are very like those of 
another, only the greatest writers can transcribe them” (210).  Austen’s 
novel is referred to as a “novel of manners” and manners in Pride and 
Prejudice can be considered indicators to major cultural and personal 
values while also defining an all-inclusive and extensive reality—once 
again affirming the sociology of knowledge (Babb 9).   Language in Pride 
and Prejudice has “public meanings” (9) in the conceptual nouns and the 
careful balance of Austen’s sentence structure, characteristics which 
provide a linguistic background of order against which the improprieties  
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and irregularities of speech, and the lexical crudities of her immoral 
characters may be judged.   In Austen’s novel the institution of language is 
essentially equivalent to institutional reality (Searle 60).  Language 
perpetuates the justification for and validation of class and gender bias 
and upholds the outmoded, archaic prejudices that have historically 
produced gender inequality and, thus, discord and misunderstanding 


































                        Austen’s Silences, the De-Construction of Mr. Darcy,  
                                                 and Spaces of Possibility 
            
           Language establishes and maintains the basic gender identity that 
produces female inferiority.  Susan Hekman states that “language erases 
the distinction between female and feminine that is central to an 
understanding of the nature of the oppression of women” (51).  The 
language we speak constructs a condition in which the qualities that 
women possess simply by virtue of their biological sex become 
indiscernible from those they are taught they should possess in order to be 
acknowledged as feminine.  “Sex and gender become intertwined” (51) 
producing historically specific gender roles that have bound women in an 
inferior place on the literary and socio-economic scene.  The fact that 
women are regarded as irrational and men as rational exposes the 
underlying fundamental problem of masculine/feminine duality, since, as 
Hekman explains, “woman is always defined as that which is not man; she 
is a ‘minus male’ who is identified by the qualities that she lacks” (51). 
           Many dichotomous categories of thought can be traced to ancient 
Greek civilizations, and as Moira Gatens explains, the earliest records we  
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have, which date from the ancient Ionians (approximately 1000 B. C.), 
reveal a table of dichotomous distinctions: good/bad, light/dark, 
unity/plurality, limited/unlimited, and male/female (99).  Maleness is 
associated with positive connotations, while femaleness is associated with 
the negative.  Gatens explains that dichotomous thought is not bad or 
oppressive per se; but rather, it can covertly promote social and political 
values that generate hierarchies and advance masculine sexual and 
linguistic modes of behavior, which serve to obliterate the many facets of 
feminine voice and desire.  This deliberate schism between the natures of 
men and women is a major aspect of patriarchal ideology and is deeply 
enmeshed in European philosophical tradition, a tradition that has 
profoundly affected the formation of our concept of masculinity and 
femininity (99).   
           G. Lloyd’s analyses of the history of conceptions of reason 
demonstrate that “the maleness of the Enlightenment ‘man of reason’ is no 
superficial linguistic bias” (ix).  Rather, she asserts that the latent 
correlations between reason, masculinity, truth and the intellect, on the 
one hand, and between sense, femininity, error and emotion, on the other, 
are so embedded and prevalent in the history of Western culture that they 
effectively prevent women’s “participation in reason” (ix) by denying 
them access to basic institutions and relegating them to the domestic  
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realm.  R. W. Connell states that masculinity establishes its dominant 
status in a society, in part, by its claim to embody the power of reason, 
which logically, and as the supporters of patriarchy would have women 
believe, represents the interests of society in general.  This link between 
masculinity and rationality is a key aspect in societal change, as well as in 
changes in masculinities (165).   
           With the growth of capitalism in the late eighteenth-century, 
rationalism also increased, not only in the marketplace, but in the culture 
as a whole.  As the nineteenth-century progressed, reason evolved as 
technology advanced, and “efficiency of means” became valued over 
“ultimate ends” (Connell 165).  The era of the powerful hereditary 
landowners, the gentry, such as Austen’s Fitzwilliam Darcy, with their 
ancient code of honor and duty to family tradition, gave way, according to 
Connell, to a splitting of gentry masculinity and an emergence of new 
hegemonic forms (191).  The reasons central to these complex changes can 
be attributed to increased challenges to the gender order by women.  The 
emergence of eighteenth-century feminism as a form of mass politics, 
along with the inevitable gendering of the industrial work force severely 
affected men’s prerogatives.  Moreover, the conditions for the 
preservation of patriarchy changed with these new affronts to 
conventional male and female roles, thus, forcing men to  
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reassess and reformulate predictable attitudes which overemphasized 
men’s needs and neglected women’s separate destinies. 
           Susan Kneedler states that the oppression of women is caused by 
how both women and men are taught to think women are “uninteresting 
and irrelevant” (36).  In Austen’s novel, men and women are equally 
remarkable.  Austen persuades us to imagine that, in both life and love, 
there is the possibility of a “reciprocity of mutual cooperation and 
knowledge and communication,” which is more personal than what a 
patriarchal society teaches us to expect (78).  Austen’s novel recognizes 
that a patriarchal psychology imposes a system in which men enter 
relations with women and marriage as predators and conquerors, whereas 
women are expected to find contentment in being, as  Kneedler states, 
“taken over, taken away, and taken in” (78).  Fitzwilliam Darcy first 
proposes to Elizabeth Bennet under the egotistical assumption that he is 
such a good “catch” that this independent-minded, yet lower-class young 
woman will naturally delight in the prospect of marrying into such a 
wealthy and important family as the Darcys.  Mr. Darcy’s feelings are, at 
once, baffled, frustrated, and decisively wounded when Elizabeth 
promptly, and curtly, rejects his offer of marriage realizing that her  
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“connections” (38) are objectionable, and somewhat mortifying to the 
lordly Mr. Darcy.  Elizabeth teaches him, as he states toward the end of  
Pride and Prejudice, “How insufficient were all my pretensions to please a 
woman worthy of being pleased” (282).  Darcy discovers that love needs 
to be equally shared.   
           For Austen’s novel to extricate us from patriarchal forms, the story 
must somehow change how we view gender identity.  Since we are 
constructed to think according to the culture’s definitions, and as Susan 
Kneedler states, “according to its oppositions” (79), then those 
prescriptions are what must be upturned in order for society to change.  
Kneedler points out that a culture perpetuates its power through how it 
defines the distinction between or the relation between virtue and evil, the 
desirable and the scorned, what is safe and what is perilous, revealing 
how the old oppositions impair women’s lives (79).  Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice shows that the prevailing dualisms about men and women are 
not only monotonous, but are dishonest and misleading.  Jane Austen 
liberates us from established modes of judging and from conventional 
categories.   
           Feminist analyses of language often focus on the way in which 
language forms a connection between personal identity and gender 
identity.  Barbara Fried points out that language and gender identity  
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appear at about the same time in a child’s life.  Fried states, “Language 
does not simply communicate the link between one’s sex and one’s gender  
identity; it constitutes that link” (49).  She further explains that children 
never learn a clear and equitable sense of “personhood,” only female 
personhood and male personhood (49).  This personhood is not simply 
linked to a biological sex, but moreover, to a specific gender identity, an 
identity that typifies a society’s accepted ideas of what is masculine and 
feminine.  Central to that identity for women is irrationality.  
           G. Lloyd adds further insight into the problem of 
masculine/feminine duality by explaining that “our conception of reason 
informs our conception of personhood” in that the language we speak 
connects rationality with what it means to be a “good, fully human 
person” (ix).  Since women are excluded from the realm of rationality, it 
follows that they can neither be fully self-actualized or wholly moral 
human beings.  The changes that occurred in the conceptions of reason 
during the Enlightenment period brought about an inheritance of thought 
in which women were associated with the sensuous realm of the body, 
and men with the non-sensuous realm of reason.  This connection of 
women with the senses has generated extensive discourse on the 
relationship between women and nature that, as Michèle Cohen argues, 
established a “difference in mind that constituted the distinction of  
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character” that marked the sexes and determined the “respective, 
appropriate qualifications” (79) for gender identity.     
           Discourse of the eighteenth-century attempted to tutor women on 
the distinctions between men and women and on the importance of 
keeping with the image of the ideal woman—which was passive, weak, 
emotional, and of course, domesticated.   In 1785, Hannah More wrote in 
her Introduction to Essays on Various Subjects: 
                 Women have generally quicker perceptions; men have juster 
                 sentiments.   [. . .] Women speak to shine or to please, men to 
                 convince or confute.  Women are fond of incident, men of 
                 argument.  Women admire passionately, men approve 
                 cautiously [. . .] Men refuse to give way to the emotions they 
                 actually feel, while women sometimes affect to be transported 
                 beyond what the occasion will justify.  (fiche 1)     
 
Hannah More was not the first writer to comment on the binary 
oppositions between genders.  Michèle Cohen states that eighteenth-
century clergyman, James Fordyce, some twenty years earlier, had 
lectured young women on the finer points of deportment and on the 
different traits assigned to each sex (79).  In his book, Sermons to Young 
Women, Fordyce argues that “nature” had “formed” women’s “faculties” 
with less “vigour” than those of men (fiche year 1809).  Fordyce reminds 
women that their principal concern must remain their “destination in 
life.”  Their “chief business” is to “read men, in order to make 
[themselves] agreeable and useful.”  It is the “sentimental” talents, not the  
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“argumentative,” that women must develop.  Interestingly, it was 
Fordyce’s Sermons that Jane Austen’s Mr. Collins, in Pride and Prejudice, 
chose as proper instruction for the Bennet girls.  Austen writes: 
                 Mr. Collins readily assented [to read aloud to the ladies] and a 
                 book was produced; but on beholding it (for every thing 
                 announced it to be from a circulating library), he started back, 
                 and begging pardon, protested that he never read novels. 
   
                 Kitty stared at him, and Lydia exclaimed . . . . 
                 . . . Other books were produced, and after some deliberation he 
                 chose Fordyce’s Sermons.  (51-52)   
 
                  
Whether Fordyce is correct in his belief that the weaknesses of women’s 
minds is simply a “natural” extension of their “more delicate frame” (fiche 
year 1809), or that men’s and women’s minds are indeed fundamentally 
different, as More asserts, the discourse on what Michèle Cohen refers to 
as “the sexed mind” implied that there was a threat to women in the 
subversive content of the prevailing masculine rhetorical structures that 
defined language and, thus, patriarchy itself (79).  Women’s identity as 
subservient and marginal was confirmed in a system of archaic 
conventions and endless superstitions that removed them from truth.  
While the discourse on “the sexed mind” justified an education which  




firmly located women within the confines of the domestic space, it had an 
even greater influence on the education of boys and on the way males and 
females have been positioned in society (79).   
           Hannah More’s Essays, which were published at the end of the 
eighteenth-century, and J. L. Chirol’s Enquiry into the best System of Female 
Education, published in 1803, are two texts concerned with the education 
of women during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century.  Both 
More and Chirol agreed on the cleverness, sparkle, and resourcefulness of 
woman’s minds, but they also agreed that these qualities constructed the 
visible manifestation of her mental inferiority.  Chirol went so far as to 
state that woman has scarcely a thought she can call her own, except 
“what is fugitive and transient as lightning” (qtd. in Cohen 80), whereas, 
More placed women’s “quicker perceptions” in opposition to men’s 
“juster sentiments” (fiche 1).  What is intriguing about these comments is 
that the presence of certain mental characteristics in the female constructs 
her as deficient, while the absence of the same qualities in the male is 
thought to enhance his intellectual powers.  Cohen asserts, “The more 
invisible [the qualities], the greater their strength . . . .  By a rhetorical tour 
de force, the sexed mind was constructed so that the females would 
generate not only the physical space for the domestic comfort and felicity 
of man, but the mental space which guaranteed the superior intellectual  
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powers of the male” (Cohen 80-81).  The discourse on “the sexed mind” 
(79) constituted male intellect as greater, more complex, and stronger than 
the female’s.  Strength was at the core of maleness, and access to 
knowledge was calculated on that condition. 
           Both More and Chirol advocated a home-based education for 
women, which forced females into the home as men’s inferiors.  Chirol’s 
rudiments are harsh; he states that women are “created for the domestic 
comfort and felicity of man.”  Mothers must “train their daughters to 
consider a Husband as a Master; and matrimony as the grave of liberty . . . 
a state of pain” (qtd. in Cohen 81).  J. Paul Hunter states that Jane Austen 
“deploys her laser-like irony” to depict courtship and the marriage 
marketplace for women whose economic status made them less than 
perfect wives (16-17).  In Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, the appropriate 
economic and social negotiations are made that will ensure a husband.  
The women characters in Austen’s novel experience a “hovering sense of 
precarious social status” (16-17), which forces all of them, even the 
independent and spirited Elizabeth Bennet, to recognize their social 
powerlessness, not just victimization, but survival, under difficult and 
unequal conditions.   More and Chirol believed gender roles were natural 
and superiority was providentially inherent in the male.  The discourse on 
“the sexed mind” (Cohen 79) suggested not that males had minds and  
          Hamilton 67  
females did not, but that the minds of each sex must be educated for his or 
her appropriate place in society.  Since the discourse stressed difference, it 
was crucial that what women were taught should develop their femininity 
and confirm the “natural” distinction between the sexes.  
           Michael Kimmel states that “Much social science research has been 
mired in tired formulations of ‘sex roles’, those fixed, ahistorical 
containers of attributes and behaviors that are said to refer to masculinity 
and femininity” (95).  Biological males and females are separated into 
these “containers” (95) where they are socialized into accepting the 
attitudes and actions appropriate to their gender.  Relationships based on 
power, for example, the power of men over women, are viewed as 
inevitable and “natural,” and are not subject to challenge or change.  
Kimmel explains that those beliefs which are normative—constructed and 
enforced through social sanctions—begin to appear as normal, “designed 
by nature acting through culture” (95).   But this occurrence is deceptive, 
for the normative is not normal; rather, it is the result of a long and 
complex set of social conflicts among groups.  “It is precisely through the 
process of making a power situation appear as a fact in the nature of the 
world that traditional authority works,” writes anthropologist Maurice 
Bloch (ix).  By diminishing the historical flux of masculinity and 
femininity, both genders lessen the ability to change (63).  
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           In rhetorical history, questions about how thought develops are 
explained with the concept of invention, a Latin term meaning “to come 
upon” or “find.”  Karlyn Kohrs Campbell explains that the nearest Greek  
equivalent would be heuresis, which refers to a related, yet distinct, 
possess of trial and error (110).  The frequent topics of invention, 
according to Campbell, which included “maxims and shared assumptions 
(causality or that the future will resemble the past),” and which Aristotle 
identified as the areas from which arguments could be developed, are the 
closest associations.  The persuasive impact of character or ethos was based 
on shared and accepted virtues, and appeals or pathos arose out of 
assumed universal relations between attitudes and socio-economic class 
dynamics.  Campbell states that if “truth is merely uncovering what is 
hidden (aletheia) and its discovery is remembrance (anamnesis),” such 
explanations of the origins and evolution of thought may be sufficient, but 
if truths are socially constructed and change and develop through time, as 
I argue they do, how does this process take place and what occurrences 
are involved (110).   
           In discussing how ideas change, we know that discourse is created 
out of prior discourse and that rhetoric evolves from prior rhetoric.  The 
same sources through which any change can be achieved are, at the same 
time, “the dead hand of the past” (Campbell 110).  Our available resources  
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limit us, for they in themselves are limiting.   Moreover, originality is 
never possible since it has all been said before.  On the other hand, and as 
Campbell points out, “the symbolic resources of language are limitless” 
(112).  In analyzing the roots of the second wave of feminism, Jo Freeman 
discusses the notion of the “justifying myth,” or the ideology that 
rationalizes the subordination of a particular group.  The catalyst of 
change, according to Freeman, includes processes that destabilize or 
question such explanations (12).  N. J. Smelzer states that this erosion of a 
dominant ideology is the “symbolic or rhetorical dimension of change or 
structural strain” (viii) and must, as T. R. Gurr points out, involve a 
dominant reference group to which subordinates can compare themselves; 
moreover, the erosion must experience a “persistent aggravation” that 
ultimately propels the subordinated group toward change (48). 
           Invention of this type is a major force in the attrition of the myths 
that justify women as a lesser being and the ideological barriers that 
obstruct social change.  Therefore, according to Campbell, “The principle 
of rhetorical invention is subversion” using the “master’s tools” to 
undermine, even destroy the “master’s house” (112).  For that which 
seems exclusively to be the tools of the master—language, symbols—are, 
at once, the tools of the subordinated.  Campbell states “Invention adapts, 
reframes, associates, juxtaposes, satirizes, reverses, ridicules, and  
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constructs dominant discourse using and misusing every rhetorical 
resource possible to distort and challenge meaning.”  Invention has the 
ability to exploit history; it is, as Campbell states, “parasitic” (112).  She 
illuminates this particular point in her analysis by noting Henry Louis 
Gates’s example of the “signifyin(g) of African Americans (Gates x).   
Invention is semiotic in nature and assigns meaning to the many 
differences in human beings and to their different behaviors.  These 
meanings may appear, to the members of a society, natural and, therefore, 
inevitable and universal.  However, meaning is always mediated through 
and influenced by cultural and historical circumstances.          
           As women have discovered, social change is an exceedingly slow 
process, and the gains made can be worn away and annihilated by 
material factors, such as the removal of women’s history and the denial of 
equal education to women.  Because the constructions of womanhood as 
silent, pure, private, and submissive have denied them personhood, as 
well as civil and political rights, women have been compelled to explore 
new modes of expression from which women’s voices can be heard and 
respected.  Michel Foucault wrote shortly before his death that “the idea 
that the self is not given to us” teaches us “that there is only one practical 
consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art” (“Geneology”  
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350, 351).  This is what women have always done and will continue to do.  
Foucault writes:  
                 I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. 
                 I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent.  It 
                 seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in 
                 truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for 
                 bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 
                 “manufactures” something that does not as yet exist, that is, 
                 “fictions” it.  One “fictions” history on the basis of a political 
                 reality that makes it true, one “fictions” a politics not yet in 
                 existence on the basis of a historical truth.  (Power 193) 
 
In seeking to effect change, great works by women exploit existing 
symbolic and rhetorical resources, as illustrated in Jane Austen’s novel, 
Pride and Prejudice.   
           Austen addresses women’s concerns and speaks to all of us about 
what it means to be a human being.  J. Paul Hunter states that Austen 
takes special interest in “women whose roles, interests, feelings, and 
values have been ignored almost completely in traditional histories that 
emphasize public life” (16, 17).  Austen successfully combines fact and 
fiction, argument, and as Karlyn K. Campbell states, the “powerful 
emotion arising out of identification” (122).  Austen’s novel is a model of 
what I consider to be the calculated use of “feminine style,” or what Jan 
Marcus calls “a model of female discourse,” a “tri-log” among the woman 
writer, the women in a male-dominated society, and the woman reader 
(146-148).  Jane Austen “echoes, yet transcends convention” (Campbell  
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123), and speaks, some two centuries later, to continuing cultural 
discussions about relevant social and political issues of the day.  Pride and 
Prejudice is authored by a woman who is rhetorically mature both in terms 
of education and practice.  In other words, the masterpieces of women’s 
rhetoric emphasize the accuracy of Virginia Woolf’s astute comment about 
invention, in that “masterpieces are not single and solitary births; they are 
the outcome of many years of thinking in common, of thinking by the 
body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the single 
voice” (68-69).   
           In Pride and Prejudice, Jane Austen invents a space in which and 
from which the female voice or subjectivity can emerge.  The space is 
empowered through irony; the condemnations and opposition sometimes 
aroused over the culture’s use of women for its own ends are eased by the 
author’s clear understanding of human nature and by her gentle 
amusement over the all-too-human shortcomings and eccentricities of her 
beloved characters.  In an effort to recast the prevailing masculine 
rhetorical structures that have defined language and, thus, society as a 
whole, Austen creates a model of feminine writing as a powerful form of 
rhetorical discourse that ultimately permits feminine desire.  Austen seeks 
to specify in some detail the absence that is femininity.  For Austen, what is 
feminine is what is not said, a realm of the unconscious and of desire  
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excluded from representation in the male language-centered sphere of 
action.  Austen gives voice to the revolutionary and subversive character 
of women’s thought, while undermining the language of male rationality. 
           Women’s writing invents a relation to meaning other than that 
fundamental to male-dominated discourse.  Such meaning, according to 
Luce Irigaray, is “always in the process of weaving itself, of embracing 
itself with words, but also of getting rid of words in order not to become 
fixed, congealed in them” (29).  The silences in Austen’s text, the gaps in 
conversation reveal Austen’s skillful efforts to subvert the male text and 
the masculine word by writing that which is not said, a new terminology 
that would allow women to transform their history, and as Elaine 
Showalter states, “rescue the feminine from its stereotypical associations 
with inferiority” (249).  Austen undertakes to invent a role for women, one 
in which they can speak and act uninhibited and unrestrained. Austen 
quietly finesses a “de-construction” of the repressive structures of 
thinking that invent gender and, thus, generate the unequal social and 
political status in a patriarchal society.   
           Jane Austen offers us a new manner of masculinity in the character 
of Fitzwilliam Darcy, and a feminist’s recasting of relations between 
genders in the union of her two main characters, Elizabeth and Darcy.  
Darcy’s “transformation” is essentially a discovery of possibilities,  
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a penetration of the mysteries of the masculine presence that rejects the 
“normal,” socially accepted definition of the dominant hegemonic male 
with its prejudices and limited horizons.  Austen writes the feminine and 
in doing so encourages us to envision a new society of free and equal 
relationships that, though never fully realized within the limiting 
boundaries and traditions of her own culture, function to induce the 
effects of Truth.  Her lasting appeal resides in her fiction’s capacity to 
invent new images which can lead us to new aspirations for our lives.  
           Andrew Tolson states, “Feminism explicitly invites men themselves 
to change” (18), to become conscious of new forms of masculine identity.   
It is an uneven and complicated process; men often find it hard to talk 
about themselves or to explore relationships.  “I certainly have not the 
talent which some people possess,” states Darcy, “of conversing easily 
with those I have never seen before” (Austen 135).  Tolson asserts that, in 
their personal lives, men are commonly dogmatic and aggressively 
conservative, but the “experience of gender-fragmentation and the 
uncertainties of proletarianization” (18) force many men to question 
traditional masculine personalities.  Sheila Rowbotham explains: 





                    Hamilton 75 
 
                 Men . . . are ashamed of their own sensitivity to suffering and 
                 love because they have been taught to regard these as feminine. 
                 Men are as afraid of being rejected and despised as we (women) 
                 are.  They have only a defensive solidarity . . . .  We must be 
                 honest and help one another until they find a new way to 
                 express and organize themselves.  (43)  
 
Tolson states that we must recognize that many men remain separated 
from their emotions.  Whereas feminist women are able to theorize “from 
their own experience, preserving its nuances and sensations,” men, even 
at their most discerning, seem to theorize “about themselves, analyzing 
from the outside” (19).  In the context of commercial capitalism, the 
uncertainties of a more complex society, and the Women’s Movement, it 
has become possible for men to “de-construct” (19) their personal lives.  
The experience is difficult and most men “need to be shocked, or driven, 
to its threshold” (19).  There is a barrier of trepidation made even more 
formidable by attitudes of ignorance and guilt.   
           Mr. Darcy’s overbearing conduct and obvious self-importance 
become clear very early in Austen’s novel.  At the assembly dance, 
Bingley states: 
                 Come Darcy, I must have you dance.  I hate to see you standing 
                 about by yourself in this stupid manner.  You had much better 
                 dance. 
            
                 I certainly shall not, Darcy replied smugly.  At such an assembly 
                 as this, it would be insupportable.  Your sisters are engaged, and 
                 there is not another woman in the room, whom it would not be a 
                 punishment to me to stand up with.  (Austen 7) 
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To contrast, Mr. Bingley, who “had a pleasing countenance, and easy, 
unaffected manners” states: 
                 I would not be so fastidious as you are.”  “Upon my honour, I 
                 never met with so many pleasant girls in my life, as I have this 
                 evening. (Austen 7) 
 
Obviously, and for a good portion of the novel, the residents of Meryton 
are measured by Darcy as unworthy and deficient.  Even Darcy’s close 
friend, Mr. Bingley, is soon a mark for Darcy’s arrogance when Darcy 
hastily thwarts the relationship between Bingley and Jane Bennet on the 
pretext of concern for his friend’s well-being in contemplating a romantic 
involvement with a woman of inferior family and fortune.  Darcy’s 
inherited upper class status and socially constructed behavior as 
authoritarian and controlling are key factors in Darcy’s recurring 
manipulation of his friend, Bingley, and in his rude and condescending 
manner at the assembly dance.  Darcy and his party find the society of 
Meryton an annoyance, and indeed, it is reported by Mrs. Long that Mr. 
Darcy “seemed very angry at being spoken to” (Austen 13) by anyone 
other than those of his party.  Mr. Fitzwilliam Darcy’s remarks regarding 
the dancing at the assembly reveal his “(silent) indignation at such a mode 
of passing the evening” and at being subjected to such insipid and noisy 
people (Austen 19).  Darcy’s hasty retort to Sir William Lucas’ comments  
         Hamilton 77 
on the charms of dancing are curt, snobbish, and the syntax is broken up  
with dashes; in fact, much of the dialog in Austen’s novel in which either 
Darcy and his upper class entourage, Mr. Collins, or Lady Catherine de 
Bourgh are speaking is carefully inscribed by Austen with frequent pauses 
in sentence structure and irregularities in punctuation use.  Sir Lucas 
states: 
                 There is nothing like dancing after all.  I consider it as one of the 
                 first refinements of polished societies. 
                 Certainly, Sir; replied Darcy—and it has the advantage also of 
                 being in Vogue amongst the less polished societies of the 
                 world.—Every savage can dance.  (Austen 18)  
 
Darcy’s manifestation as Connell’s hegemonic male (76) sustains 
convention and perpetuates the patriarchal ideology of power and 
supremacy.  Darcy’s boorish silences, his haughty tone, and the gaps in 
his rhetoric communicate an image of the hierarchal male.  Whereas 
silence is used as a means to deny women their subjectivity and autonomy 
in Austen’s world, silence for Fitzwilliam Darcy is a means of control and 
strength.   
           In the first half of Pride and Prejudice, Darcy is, as Mrs. Bennet states, 
“ate up with pride” (Austen 13).  He has been taught to be “selfish and 
overbearing,” and his “mean” countenance is a product of his heritage, his 
fortune, and his privileged social standing (Austen 282).  Austen writes:   
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                 Darcy had “no sooner . . . made it clear to himself and his friends 
                 that [Elizabeth Bennet] had hardly a good feature in her face, 
                 than he began to find it was rendered uncommonly intelligent 
                 by the beautiful expression of her dark eyes.  To this discovery 
                 succeeded some others equally mortifying.  (16)  
 
Austen’s choice of the word “mortifying” reveals Darcy’s shock and 
anxiety over his keen interest in a woman of considerably less social status 
and wealth.  Darcy struggles, for well over half of Austen’s novel, to 
repress his feelings for Elizabeth.  The narrator states that “were it not for 
the inferiority of her (Elizabeth’s) connections, he (Darcy) should be in 
some danger” (Austen 38).    The silences inscribed in the lines of Pride and 
Prejudice and the gaps in conversation are Austen’s tools of rhetorical  
invention which allow her to adopt a specific female representation of the 
unconscious and of desire, which is the non-said of all discourse, in an 
attempt to repossess and recover the “positivity” of the feminine.  Irigaray 
states, “One would have to listen with another ear, as if hearing an ‘other 
meaning’.  For if ‘She’ says something, it is not, it is already no longer, 
identical with what she means” (29).  In the final chapters of Pride and 
Prejudice, the silences and gaps in dialog and sentence structure largely 
disappear from Austen’s text as she inscribes Darcy’s role and his 
language with much “more thoughtfulness” (255).  His discourse reveals 
Austen’s feminist rhetorical strategies that ultimately serve to unify and 
transcend the rigid, alienating boundaries of patriarchy allowing for the  
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possibility of both male and female desire and an establishment of 
harmonious gender relations.  Darcy is imbued with more sensibility, with 
thoughtfulness and feeling, and is changed in attitude and in behavior 
into a new manner of being male.     
           Austen, in both quietly exploiting and circumventing the language 
of patriarchy, also transcends the repressive structures of thinking that 
force men into traditional masculine personalities and confine women to 
the unchanging domestic milieu.  In a twofold movement that combines 
denunciation and creation, Austen unveils the masculine character of 
discourse, while imagining a new female feminist subject.  Darcy states, 
upon offering Elizabeth an explanation for his abhorrent actions, “I have  
been a selfish being all my life, in practice, though not in principle” 
(Austen 282).  The prevailing masculine rhetorical structures which 
maintain the principles of patriarchy, coupled with Darcy’s strong sense 
of duty and responsibility to family and estate, will not allow him to 
succumb to his own sensitivity to the hardships of others or to the 
possibility of a free and equal relationship based on mutual love and 
respect—especially with “a young woman without family, connections, or 
fortune” (Austen 272).   
           Austen writes the body feminine, and in doing so, deconstructs and 
liberates Darcy from the oppressive yoke of hegemonic ideology.  Darcy’s  
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sense of Elizabeth’s inferiority—“of its being a degradation—,” of the 
family obstacles “which judgment had always opposed to inclination,”  
and which Darcy voices to Elizabeth using a male-centered language of 
domination and power (Austen, Pride 145) gives way in Austen’s 
discourse to a new feminine-centered “language” that erases both gender 
and class prejudices and permits feminine—and masculine—desire.  
Austen’s text portrays the idea that sexual difference, as the difference that 
women make, must be constructed, and it is the task of feminine discourse 
to set in motion the conditions which will make this possibility a truth.  
Rose Braidotti states, “The feminine text, a separatist’s space, is essential if 
women are to speak their desires and shatter the silence about the 
exploitation they have undergone.  It is the theoretical and political 
building site for forms of expression and multiple struggles” (249).  The 
ultimate aim of feminine discourse is to invoke the conditions of 
possibility of in-depth transformations, which themselves stem from a 
collective effort among all women.   
           Michel Foucault, in The History of Sexuality, describes how 
confession, “one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for 
producing truth,” bestows on the recipient of the confession a measure of  
power over the one who confesses: “the agency of domination does not 
reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), but in the  
          Hamilton 81 
one who listens and says nothing; not in the one who knows and answers, 
but in the one who questions and is not supposed to know” (21).  In Pride 
and Prejudice, Darcy is grateful and gracious and states, “Elizabeth! What 
do I owe you! You taught me a lesson, hard indeed at first, but most 
advantageous.  By you, I was properly humbled” (Austen 282).  By 
performing the confessional act, Sarah S. G. Franz explains that Austen’s 
hero is “challenging the traditional power dynamics of the heterosexual 
love relationship” (158).  Franz states that by insisting that the hero 
confess to his heroine, Austen is conferring on the heroine the 
traditionally masculine authorities  of “certainty, validation, acceptance, 
and reconciliation, and establishes for the reader the concept that the hero 
not only can change, but that he must change in order to deserve the 
heroine” (158).  For Elizabeth, respect and love have been earned, just as 
Austen would have it; for Mr. Darcy, the realization that privilege and 
wealth do not preclude kindness and grace brings about a sharing of 
common desires between Austen’s two main characters.  In this beautiful 
progression of feeling between Austen’s two main characters, from 
“dislike” to “respect” to “esteem” to “gratitude” (282) and a real interest 
in each others welfare, each sentiment is defined by Austen in her 
revolutionary and visionary model of feminine writing.  
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           The accepted image of the hegemonic male involves dominance 
over women, in social, as well as private relations, and over other men, in 
the occupational world.  But being the “master” has its liabilities.  Jack 
Sawyer states, “It is not really possible for two persons to have a free 
relationship when one holds the balance of power over the other . . . 
Persons bent on dominance are inhibited from developing themselves” 
(171).  But the problem in being authoritarian in one situation means 
subscribing to a system in which the oppressor is subordinated in another 
situation (171).  A different and better alternative would be a system in 
which men share, among themselves and with women, rather than 
attempting a dominant role.   
             Discourse cannot be separated from political practice; together 
they form the core of the struggle to reject and overturn the culture’s anti-
woman structures.  Rosi Braidotti states:  
                 Women’s coming into writing, and therefore, the expression of 
                 specifically feminine speech in the text, is not a historical give 
                 which has already been achieved in the current context; no more 
                 is it a guaranteed future triumph, the glorious return of the 
                 repressed, but rather, an event which rests on a certain number 
                 of preconditions, in particular, the development of women’s 
                 socio-political struggles.  (250) 
 
“If woman has always been outside the economy of the logos,” as Braidotti 
claims, it is because “she is in herself an excess, a too much which cannot 
find its place in traditional discourses” (249).  The mystery she represents  
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in a culture which claims to interpret and catalog everything in terms of 
unanimity and individuality recognizes woman as “neither one nor two” 
(Irigaray 26); she is not the subject, but the object.  This myth of difference  
which is concealed by the façade of gender guides feminist writers in 
search of women’s “unexplored possibilities and potentialities” (Braidotti 
251).  Their aim is to denounce the implicit link between reason and 
masculinity which has brought about the radical transformation in our 
understanding of subjectivity and rendered women’s experience visible.  
This deconstruction of the classical system of representation constitutes 
the most significant and explicitly feminist phase in the re-reading of the 
history of Western philosophy.    
           When women want to break free from exploitation, they do not 
simply destroy a few prejudices; they call into question all existing 
thought and language, since these are controlled by men alone.  Women 
confront the very foundation of our social and cultural order, whose 
organization has been constructed by a patriarchal system.  The 
oppression of women is both real and symbolic; that is, its foundation lies 
as much in the material structures of repression as on philosophical  
presuppositions.  The basis of masculine logic in its entirety can be 
explained in what Irigaray calls sexual “in-difference” (29) and in its 
propensity to reduce everything to the same, to the one, the masculine.   
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Irigaray states, “This domination of the philosophical logos stems in large 
part from its power to reduce all others to the economy of the Same.”  It is 
always a “teleological, constructive project” of the diversion and  
reduction of the “other”, of woman.  Thus, we discover the necessity of 
“reopening the figures of philosophical discourse . . . in order to pry out . . 
. what they have borrowed that is feminine, from the feminine” (74).   
           In other words, the historical phenomenon that is the annulment of 
the classical subject of representation could lead us to reveal the 
possibility of a new non-logocentric way of thinking.  This premise, 
according to Braidotti, is the “philosophy of sexual difference” (252).  It is 
not enough to denounce the fanatical narcissism of philosophical reason; it 
is more a matter of making a different discursive space available for the 
“female feminine” (Irigaray 29).    
           The premise of Western philosophy rests on “primacy according to 
Reason” (Braidotti 253).  This principle is analyzed as the “natural” light 
which allegedly illuminates all truth, but it essentially functions at the 
expense of the woman’s body.  The “material body, [the] matrix of being” 
is renounced and devalued in the “self-affirmation” of the masculine  
logos, which uses pure Reason as its excuse (253).  Reduced to 
unconsciousness, or rather, to the negative of masculine consciousness, 
woman embodies the void of nothingness.  The historical notion of the  
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philosophical subject was strictly conjecture, yet it weighed profoundly on 
the destiny of women.  It was not until the twentieth-century that the idea  
was scientifically refuted.  Women speaking and writing has crumbled not 
only the “master’s” house, but Western Reason as well.    
           In understanding the lived experience of masculinity, we need to 
understand more about the relationship between social experience and the 
structures which define that experience.  The process of what Tolson 
refers to as “consciousness-raising” (18), which is a first step in gender 
transformation, seems to support the Marxist theory that within a social 
formation (determined by relations of production, class, and gender) there 
are two kinds of defining structure: not only social institutions, such as 
schools and the legal system, but also “general ideologies” (Tolson 140), 
which are located in types of ritual and language.  Social consciousness is 
as much constructed by the codes of a “general ideological discourse”, as 
it is by institutional prescripts and limitations.  Patriarchy, as a “general 
ideology” (140), is largely encouraged by systems of speech and by 
inherited customs and practices.  Through language, patriarchy remains a 
powerful source of identification for men, even when the primary  
institution in which it is located—the family—has lost much of its former 
importance due to the expansion of capitalism.  Tolson states that the 
language of patriarchy is a rational language that makes definitions and  
                                           Hamilton 86 
connections; it is the “language of abstraction” that ultimately “enshrines” 
the power of men.  It is the “social language of which ‘man’, as such, is the  
subject” (140).   It is in the silences of this language, as Jane Austen 
illustrates, that a repressed masculinity is imprisoned.  Austen’s inscribes 
Fitzwilliam Darcy with the desire to be a more sentient, willing, and 
sincere male.  Through the self-conscious act of writing against received 
tradition, Austen provides us with the possibility of a world less unfeeling 
and narrow-minded.    
           Becoming conscious of masculinity not only involves transforming 
social institutions, but also understanding the words of the powerful.  
Historically, a revolutionary movement is required to break the hold of 
the dominant group over social theory; this movement has to structure its 
own associations.  Learning new ways of speaking and writing as 
experienced in the inscription of the feminine voice must accompany the 
deconstruction of masculinity and, thus, the establishment of a non-sexist, 
collective society. 
               In a brilliant display of classic rhetorical invention, Austen 
employs convention in order to subvert it by imbuing her female 
protagonists with the ancient philosophical male representational quality 
of Reason.  Austen’s novels take the power out of the cliché that men are  
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“rational” and “logical,” while women are “emotional” and variable.  The 
real cultural distinction is that men are encouraged to say their emotions,  
to be confident that they will be validated by the term “logical;” that is, 
their emotions will be treated as if they reflect reality.  This is the 
definition of the term “rational.”  But women’s emotions are condemned 
as different from that, as private and personal.  The climactic scene of the 
novel where Elizabeth arrives at a distinctly different view of Darcy is a 
reasoned judgment of character that Ruben Brower states is reached 
through a lengthy familiarity and a deliberate weighing of probabilities so 
that the “certainty is an achieved certainty” (Fields 174).  The seemingly 
insignificant dialogues in Pride and Prejudice are constantly being 
underscored by Austen’s interest in human beings and their behavior, her 
awareness that character is expressed by what people say and do, and in 
the possibility of forming sensible judgments.  The idea that more 
reasonable interpretations of words and actions are attainable provides for 
the movement toward a decisive change in relationships that can 
deconstruct and recast pervasive, stereotypical attitudes and associations.  
Elizabeth demonstrates that the whole division between reason and 
feeling is false, so that we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that 
sensibility is a woman’s trait, and sense a man’s.  In general, states 
Kneedler, “women and men  . . . have both emotions and needs which we  
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try to validate through logical processes” (22).  Austen writes, in a dialog 
between Mr. Wickham and Elizabeth: 
      I dare not hope, he continued in a lower and more serious tone, 
                 that he is improved in essentials. 
                 Oh, no! said Elizabeth.  In essentials, I believe, he is very much 
                 what he ever was. 
                 When I said that he improved on acquaintance, I did not mean 
                 that either his mind or manners were in a state of improvement, 
                 but that from knowing him better, his disposition was better 
                 understood.  (179) 
 
This process of judgment fits exactly the duality of Darcy’s character and 
the picture of Elizabeth as “a rational creature speaking the truth from her 
heart” (Austen 83). 
           Charlotte Lucas’s hardheaded views on love and marriage reveal a 
strong propensity toward Reason in Austen’s novel.  She is described by 
Austen in a passage introducing the Lucas family: 
                 Lady Lucas was a very good kind of woman, not too clever to be 
                 a valuable neighbor to Mrs. Bennet.—They had several children. 
                 They had several children. The eldest of them a sensible,  
                 intelligent young woman, about twenty-seven, was Elizabeth’s 
                 intimate friend.”  (12) 
 
Charlotte states her opinion on Bingley and Jane Bennet’s relationship.  
The prudent young woman takes the position that Jane risks losing 
Bingley unless she shows her feelings more openly.  She states:  
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                 We can all begin freely—a slight preference is natural enough; 
                 but there are very few of us who have heart enough to be really  
                 in love without encouragement.  In nine cases out of ten, a 
                 woman had better shew more affection than she feels.    
                 (Austen, Pride 12) 
 
Charlotte start out in Pride and Prejudice as a visibly independent thinker 
who rejects the culture’s formulations of courtship and marriage.  But she 
ends up, as Susan Kneedler explains, “absorbed into the identity of the 
person she marries, who says, ‘My dear Charlotte and I have but one 
mind and one way of thinking’” (Austen, Pride 165).  Charlotte’s rationale 
overrules any emotion that might dissuade her from doing just what she 
has been taught: to marry a man who will make use of her.  
           Kneedler states that Austen demonstrates to us, in Pride and 
Prejudice that women need to assert their individualism and self-rule (43).  
“We can not only reject the culture’s stereotypes, we must refuse to judge 
our lives by them” (43).  Women must develop new ways of thinking 
about themselves, and about love.  Men, as Austen’s Mr. Darcy ultimately 
demonstrates, must learn to question masculine sexual and linguistic 
modes of behavior and step out of their hegemonic roles in order to adopt 
a more open and honest approach to gender relations.  The rhythmic and 
unifying language of Austen’s feminine writing posits just such a 
possibility.   
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   Notes 
1. Quotes from J. L. Chirol’s Enquiry Into the best System of Female 
Education was taken from Michèle Cohen’s Fashioning Masculinity: 
National Identity and Language in the Eighteenth Century.  New York: 
Routledge, 1996.  79-97.   It was not possible to view the original 
work by Chirol, since the text is housed at only three known 
libraries, according to a search on WorldCat.  An attempt was made 
to secure a copy of the text by the Interlibrary Loan department at 
the Max Chambers Library on the campus of the University of 
Central Oklahoma; however, the these libraries declined the request 
due to the scarcity of available copies. 
 
2. For the purposes of this thesis, I have re-defined misogyny as a 
cluster of discourses circulating within the culture directed against 
all women everywhere, and as a set of codes to be taken up for 
various aims at different moments in history.  Gender relations are 
thoroughly entrenched within semiotic and cultural codes, which in 
turn define the consciousness of the individual and the ways in 
























           In writing Pride and Prejudice, Jane Austen nurtures and develops 
what is most innovative and subversive in women’s thought, while 
avoiding the classic trappings which await the feminine: mimicry 
dependency, denigration, hysteria, aporia.  Austen employs her writing as 
a means to speak, think, and create within structures that are misogynistic 
and which attempt to gain power and dominance through the exclusion 
and appropriation of the feminine.  Austen’s repossesses and recovers the 
positivity of the feminine in the deconstruction of Fitzwilliam Darcy.  Mr. 
Darcy’s behavior and attitudes in the first chapters of Pride and Prejudice 
reflect deeply ingrained and socially constructed ideologies consistent 
with the often perverse and oppressive dictates of a patriarchal culture.  
Darcy, instructed from birth to act within the strictly prescribed 
boundaries of a hegemonic masculinity is oblivious to Elizabeth’s 
humanity.  Upon their first meeting, Darcy rejects Elizabeth as 
unattractive; he assumes that he has only to speak to her later to appease 
her bruised sensibilities.  In the later chapters of Austen’s novel, Darcy is 
changed from imagining that he is doing Elizabeth a favor by subjecting 
himself to the “degradation” of marrying her, to being earnestly grateful  
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that she could love him (Austen 146).  Darcy learns that money, property, 
and social position are unimportant compared to the happiness he 
experiences when he realizes Elizabeth cares for him.   
           Austen addresses the question of how a woman can be a conceptual 
thinker and not be contaminated by the dominant masculine nature of 
theoretical thought.  Austen adopts a series of rhetorical tactics in tackling 
the socio-cultural issues concerning women of her time period.  By writing 
the feminine text, Austen transforms Darcy’s hegemonic attitudes and 
actions into a new kind of masculinity that rejects the oppressive, 
hierarchal roles that are constructed and perpetuated in a patriarchal 
society.  For it is the disjunction in value between men and women which 
allows and derives from a structure organized for the benefit and 
empowerment of men.  Austen’s novel locates blame where it belongs, not 
in women or men, but in the culture, in its social structures as exemplified 
in gender bias and class prejudice, and in its myths, which construct us all, 
both women and men, to venerate men and disparage women.  Jane 
Austen declares her belief, not in men as the creators of order, but in the 
individual’s freedom to create within a given order that is equal and 
mutually beneficial to all so that we may witness the end of inequality and 
the demise of the sovereignty of the father.   
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